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The New State Sovereignty Movement
AUSTIN RAYNOR*
In the past decade, states across the country have enacted a flood of legislation
to resist perceived federal encroachments on their sovereignty. These opposition
statutes assume a variety of forms: some, for instance, merely prohibit state officers
from assisting in the enforcement of federal law, while others purport to nullify
particular federal regulations. In the fields of controlled substances, immigration,
and healthcare, among others, state acts of protest have stimulated the national
debate and influenced legal obligations in important ways.
This Article provides the first comprehensive overview of this nascent state
sovereignty movement. It categorizes opposition enactments according to the legal and
political purposes they are designed to advance, analyzes the likelihood of preemption,
and explores the functions they may serve despite the existence of conflicting federal
law. It then proceeds to identify the structural features these laws share as a class, before
concluding with an assessment of their normative implications.
The increasing polarization of national politics will only amplify the importance of
state resistance efforts. The paucity of scholarship addressing this issue therefore
represents a major gap in academic efforts to grasp the changing dynamics of intersovereign conflict in the United States. This Article begins to remedy that blind spot.
The concepts it articulates represent valuable tools not only for exploring state
legislative resistance to federal policy, but also for addressing the range of issues
arising from federal discord and geographical polarization more broadly.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA) amidst a circus of fanfare and acrimony.1 The ACA inspired deep
economic, cultural, and constitutional disputes. It also raised important questions of
federal power and state autonomy. States governed by conservative blocs did not
accept the statute’s requirements passively. In addition to filing lawsuits, they enacted
a host of legislative measures ostensibly designed to obstruct implementation of the
new law.2 Virginia’s bill, for example, declared that “[n]o resident of this
Commonwealth . . . shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual
insurance coverage except as required by a court.”3 The precise function of such
opposition statutes was unclear: some appeared to be merely expressive, others
jurisdictional, and still others mimicked historical nullification measures.4 Critics
condemned the laws as divisive relics of an earlier era, while proponents viewed them
as a last resort to counteract an overreaching federal leviathan.5
Often overlooked is the fact that the states’ response to the ACA was not an
isolated event. Instead, it was indicative of a much broader trend that has swept
statehouses across the country over the course of the past decade.6 Federal policy
subject to regional unpopularity has increasingly been met with affirmative

1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
2. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVII, § 2(A)(1) (“A law or rule shall not compel, directly
or indirectly, any person, employer or health care provider to participate in any health care
system.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-9003(2) (2011) (“It is hereby declared that the public policy
of the state of Idaho . . . is that every person within the state of Idaho is and shall be free to
choose or decline to choose any mode of securing health care services without penalty or threat
of penalty by the federal government . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-1-2505.5(3)(a)
(LexisNexis 2011) (“The state shall not require an individual in the state to obtain or maintain
health insurance . . . .”).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2014).
4. See infra Part II.A; infra Part III.B; infra Part II.E–F.
5. See, e.g., Ben Jacobs, Exclusive: GOP Senate Candidate Caught Saying States Can Nullify
Federal Laws, DAILY BEAST (July 28, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/28
/exclusive-gop-senate-candidate-caught-saying-states-can-nullify-laws.html (rejecting nullification
as unconstitutional and linking it to antebellum proponents of slavery); William F. Jasper, Sheriffs
and Legislators Are Acting To Nullify Obama Gun Controls, NEW AMERICAN (Feb. 4, 2013),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/14394-sheriffs-and-legislators-are
-acting-to-nullify-obama-gun-controls (characterizing nullification as a valid tool to resist
“unconstitutional overreach” by the federal government).
6. “An Associated Press analysis found that about four-fifths of the states now have
enacted local laws that directly reject or ignore federal laws on” various subjects. David A.
Lieb, Federal Nullification Efforts Mounting in States, THE BIG STORY (June 21, 2013, 4:31
AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/federal-nullification-efforts-mounting-states.
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legislative resistance of various stripes. In the fields of controlled substances,7
immigration,8 and gun rights,9 among others, state acts of protest have stimulated the
national debate and influenced legal obligations in important ways. As a substantive
matter, these opposition statutes take a variety of forms: some, for instance, merely
prohibit state officers from assisting in the enforcement of federal law,10 while others
purport to nullify particular federal regulations.11 Such resistance efforts originate
from across the political spectrum and are used to advance a host of diverse policy
preferences. Notwithstanding the threat of preemption, they are capable of generating
significant effects in a variety of spheres, from federal enforcement policy to
constitutional doctrine.
Although their ramifications are most salient in the political arena, opposition
statutes also raise a host of delicate legal questions. These issues lie at the intersection
of several disparate domains of scholarship, including cooperative federalism,
constitutional construction, and even substantive areas like the Fourth and Second
Amendments. Although these various fields are useful in illuminating certain facets
of state opposition, none is capable of capturing the full range of normative and
conceptual issues such defiance generates. This Article marshals a diverse array of
scholarship to provide the first comprehensive portrait of state legislative resistance
to federal policy.12 It situates this nascent movement within the existing literature

7. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007).
8. See, e.g., Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, Ariz.
Sess. Laws 450 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, and 41 (2010)).
9. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-404(a) (2013).
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part II.E.
12. Several well-developed fields shed light on the phenomenon of state resistance
without fully explaining it. The literature on constitutional construction, for instance,
illuminates certain political ramifications of opposition statutes. See, e.g., KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and
Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture,
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). Articles assessing departmentalism and judicial review highlight
the pitfalls and benefits of decentralized constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1359 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power
To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). Scholarship examining opportunistic
federalism illustrates the complex motives underlying state resistance efforts. See, e.g., Frank
B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304 (1999); John O. McGinnis &
Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System,
99 NW. U. L. REV. 89 (2004). Other federalism literature serves to explore the dynamics of
intersovereign friction more generally. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual
Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998); cf. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:
Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987) (cataloguing the benefits of
competitive federalism). At the micro level, several articles have explored state resistance in
the context of a single subject matter. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Vigor of the AntiCommandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1231 (2004); Elizabeth
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and imposes a measure of analytical structure on what is, at least facially, an
extraordinarily diverse phenomenon. The discussion that follows is both descriptive
and normative. It includes a taxonomy of the legal and political purposes these
enactments are designed to serve, an assessment of their shared structural features,
and a tentative evaluation of their costs and benefits.
Part I sketches a brief history of state legislative and executive resistance to national
policy. Historically, such efforts were classed under the heading of “nullification.”
Although nullification statutes have, at various intervals since the Founding, prominently
been enlisted in the service of besmirched causes (such as Massive Resistance),13 their
full pedigree reveals substantial ideological variance. Furthermore, as this Article will
illustrate, the term “nullification” embraces only a narrow segment of the broad class of
modern statutes enacted to obstruct or curtail federal law.
Part II provides a detailed taxonomy of recent state laws14 intended to thwart
federal programs, arranged according to their declared purposes. Each of the six
sections of the taxonomy is accompanied by a brief preemption discussion. The most
innocuous category includes statutes that serve purely expressive functions; these
laws express opposition to federal policy but decline to create any legal rights or
obligations. Tenth Amendment resolutions, for instance, merely reaffirm state
sovereignty without purporting to have any direct legal effect.15 The second category
features statutes that explicitly refrain from penalizing, as a matter of state law,
conduct that is prohibited under federal law. Medical (and recreational) marijuana
statutes provide a pertinent example.16 The third category encompasses those statutes
that prohibit state officials from participating in the enforcement of a particular
federal law (e.g., the Patriot Act), while the fourth category includes state

Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health
Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111 (2010); David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana
Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power To Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567
(2013). Finally, certain authors have begun to conceive of resistance efforts as representative
of a unified movement, though none has examined it with the depth and scope of this Article.
See, e.g., THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., NULLIFICATION: HOW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY IN THE
21ST CENTURY (2010); John Dinan, Contemporary Assertions of State Sovereignty and the
Safeguards of American Federalism, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1637 (2010–11); Keely N. Kight,
Comment, Back to the Future: The Revival of the Theory of Nullification, 65 MERCER L. REV.
521 (2014). In this vein, a recent Arkansas Law Review symposium explored, from historical
and theoretical perspectives, the reemergence of the doctrines of secession and nullification in
twenty-first century America. Symposium, Cooper’s Shadow: Secession, Nullification, and
States’ Rights, 67 ARK. L. REV. 1 (2014).
13. Ryan Card, Note, Can States “Just Say No” to Federal Health Care Reform? The
Constitutional and Political Implications of State Attempts To Nullify Federal Law, 2010 BYU
L. REV. 1795, 1800.
14. The vast majority of state resistance efforts involve statutes, which thus serve as the focus
of this Article. Nevertheless, alternative forms of opposition—such as executive orders and
constitutional amendments—are also occasionally employed. See, e.g., Ryan S. Hunter, Note,
Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing: Nullification and the Question of Gubernatorial Executive
Power in Idaho, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 659, 705 (2013). For the most part, these alternative modes of
resistance raise the same legal and political issues as their statutory counterparts.
15. See, e.g., S.C.R. 3, 2010 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010).
16. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007).
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supplementation of federal law enforcement efforts. Arizona’s controversial
immigration laws exemplify this latter category.17
The more contentious opposition statutes, however, not only establish state
policies with respect to state officers but actually purport to nullify federal law within
the territorial boundaries of the complaining state. The fifth category in the taxonomy
includes statutes that specifically declare federal law void or that outlaw certain
substantive policies adopted by the federal government. The sixth and final category
embraces statutes that not only purport to nullify federal law but also provide
criminal penalties for state or federal agents who attempt to enforce federal law in
contravention of state policy.
Part III builds on the analysis in Part II by exploring the primary purposes that
opposition statutes may advance, apart from those expressed in their text and despite
any constraints imposed by federal law. Almost all opposition laws serve an
expressive function by empowering national minorities to effectively voice their
dissent. The expressive character of these laws may also be effective in directly
shaping social norms and public opinion. For instance, a statute that removes state
penalties for conduct prohibited at the national level may reduce the public stigma
attached to the proscribed activity, despite the fact that the federal prohibition
remains in force.
Second, opposition laws are capable of influencing the judicial process in myriad
ways. For example, a nullification statute that purports to invalidate federal policy
may serve as a catalyst for private citizens to bring lawsuits challenging federal
regulatory regimes. At a more substantive level, the constitutional principles
endorsed by opposition statutes can exert a gravitational effect on the legal reasoning
utilized by courts engaged in constitutional adjudication. These bills may also
contribute to the formation of enforceable constitutional understandings outside the
courts. Both of these latter avenues of influence reflect the role opposition measures
play in the process of constitutional politics.
Finally, opposition laws may have an impact on national policy. State decisions
to refrain from penalizing conduct prohibited at the federal level, for instance, may
encourage the national government to reallocate its enforcement resources to those
activities proscribed under both state and federal law. Marijuana policy represents a
prime example of this effect. Relatedly, statutes that bar state officials from
implementing a particular federal program may spur changes in national substantive
policy. The federal government relies heavily on state manpower to realize its policy
goals and thus may be willing to tweak those goals in order to obtain state assistance.
Part IV makes several transsubstantive observations pertaining to state opposition
statutes as a class. Perhaps the most significant unifying characteristic of these laws
is their tendency to phrase objections to federal policy, or assertions of state
authority, in constitutional terms.18 This feature not only imparts an aura of

17. See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, Ariz. Sess.
Laws 450 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11,
13, 23, 28, 41 (2010)).
18. The Idaho Health Freedom Act, for example, states:
The power to require or regulate a person’s choice in the mode of securing health
care services, or to impose a penalty related thereto, is not found in the
Constitution of the United States of America, and is therefore a power reserved
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legitimacy to a potentially suspect enterprise but also represents a form of
constitutional politics. Constitutional revolutions often crystallize outside the context
of formal adjudication. Opposition statutes thus enable states to participate in the
nonjudicial process of constitutional construction.
A second permeating characteristic of this body of law is its variable political
orientation. Resistance measures serve a broad range of purposes originating from
across the political spectrum. State sovereignty is invoked not only to protect
traditionally right-wing causes, such as free trade in firearms, but also stereotypically
left-wing causes, such as access to medical marijuana. Political diversity in what is
essentially a states’ rights movement bears out, at least in part, a theory of
opportunistic federalism, which posits that invocations of federalism tend to be
spurred by specific substantive concerns, rather than by an interest in protecting the
federal structure per se.
A third ubiquitous feature of these statutes is their territorialism. Even bills that
explicitly nullify federal law only purport to extinguish its effect within the physical
borders of the complaining state.19 Nullification and related tactics—both historically
and today—are limited, defensive mechanisms designed merely to neutralize federal
policy as it applies to state residents.
Part V addresses the normative aspects of the state sovereignty movement and
tentatively concludes that this phenomenon is desirable insofar as it promotes the
purposes of federalism within the bounds of law. This verdict is necessarily
conditional; the primary function of this Part is merely to identify the conceptual
tools necessary to conduct meaningful analysis in this area. Traditional nullification
efforts posed serious threats to national unity to the extent that they involved state
assertions of interpretive supremacy on constitutional issues. The modern recasting
of these efforts, however, accepts judicial supremacy in actually litigated cases while
still enabling interpretive pluralism on subject matters that remain in legal flux.
Certain problems—such as the tendency to produce legal uncertainty—continue to
plague even this modern incarnation. In general, though, contemporary opposition
statutes advance important federalism values without fomenting the divisive
sectionalism that marred earlier nullification attempts. To facilitate the analysis, this
Part introduces the concept of “vertical departmentalism,” or the exercise of
independent interpretive authority over the Constitution by state actors. Vertical
departmentalism serves to supplement its horizontal counterpart by further
decentralizing the interpretive task.
The nature and extent of state power are recurring and important leitmotifs in the
American constitutional project. Nullification, in particular, has historically provided
a flashpoint for debate over the limits of state autonomy. State legislative opposition
to federal policy therefore provides an apt vehicle for exploring deep themes of
federalism and sovereignty. The modern manifestation of this tradition, although it

to the people pursuant to the Ninth Amendment, and to the several states pursuant
to the Tenth Amendment.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-9003(1) (2011).
19. The Virginia Healthcare Freedom Act, for instance, provides that “[n]o resident of
this Commonwealth . . . shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance
coverage.” VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2014) (emphasis added).
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enjoys a rich lineage, is a distinctive and novel phenomenon that warrants a
comprehensive treatment of its own.
If current trends persist, the importance of this movement will only increase with
time. American politics are marked by escalating polarization, both geographical and
political.20 This development likely has its roots in certain structural features of
modern American democracy and is therefore unlikely to recede for the foreseeable
future.21 Geographical polarization ensures that federal programs and regulations
frequently garner intense resistance in discrete areas of the country. These conditions
provide fertile ground for state opposition efforts, which track local disenchantment
with federal policy. To the extent polarization continues to intensify,22 such efforts
can be expected to accelerate correspondingly.
Opposition statutes thus potentially signify a new paradigm for state-level
politics, one in which state legislatures operate as fundamentally reactive institutions
that serve to mediate the relationship between the federal government and state
citizens. As this Article shows, such state-level politics can have an enormous effect
on national policy. The paucity of scholarship addressing this issue therefore
represents a major gap in academic efforts to grasp the changing dynamics of state
and federal relationships. This Article begins to remedy that blind spot, providing a
research agenda and the conceptual tools necessary to assess not only the burgeoning
sovereignty movement but also the gamut of issues arising from geographical
polarization and federal discord more broadly.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NULLIFICATION
Historically, overt forms of state resistance to federal policy were grouped under
the heading of “nullification.” Nullification takes place when a state declares that a
particular federal law is unconstitutional and therefore inoperative.23 Nullification

20. See, e.g., William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77
UMKC L. REV. 307, 312–15 (2008); PEW RES. CENTER, PARTISAN POLARIZATION SURGES IN
BUSH, OBAMA YEARS (2012).
21. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 332 (2011) (“[O]ur radically
polarized politics . . . reflect long-term structural and historical changes in American
democracy that are likely to endure for some time to come.”).
22. Steven Strauss, Six Reasons American Political Polarization Will Only Get Worse,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2012, 4:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-strauss
/megatrend-six-reasons-ame_b_1965182.html. It might do so, for instance, if voters drift
geographically towards other like-minded voters, thereby sorting themselves into ideological
enclaves. See Galston, supra note 20, at 312–15.
23. H. Newcomb Morse, The Foundations and Meaning of Secession, 15 STETSON L. REV.
419, 420 (1986). Senator John Calhoun defined nullification as “declaring null an
unconstitutional act of the General Government, as far as the State is concerned.” Id. (quoting
W. STEPHENSON, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE OLD SOUTH 167 (1959)). Although the terms
“nullification” and “interposition” originally had different connotations, their contemporary
meanings have largely converged. Robert S. Claiborne, Jr., Comment, Why Virginia’s
Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Did Not Invoke Nullification,
24.
See infra notes 43, 47, 65, and
46 U. RICH. L. REV. 917, 924 & n.49 (2012).
accompanying text.
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traditionally has been used as a defensive measure designed primarily to neutralize
the impact of federal policy within the territorial borders of the nullifying state.24
Direct nullification, obviously, does not exhaust the wide variety of opposition
efforts examined in this Article.25 For instance, state statutes that provide for
enhanced enforcement of federal law plainly do not qualify as nullification measures
in the traditional sense.
A concise historical summary can nevertheless be illuminating for several
reasons. Despite the important dissimilarities between the two classes of laws, many
commentators have explicitly analogized contemporary antifederal enactments to
their historical predecessors.26 The following account thus provides relevant context
for the debate. Furthermore, the normative inquiry contained in Part V attempts to
demonstrate that modern opposition efforts are less divisive and potentially
destructive than their forebears. The summary that follows sets the stage for this later
discussion. It also introduces many of the themes and ideas that continue to
characterize opposition statutes, including political opportunism and the use of
constitutional rhetoric.
The first and most famous treatment of the nullification doctrine occurred with
the passage of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799.27 The
Resolutions were drafted by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, respectively, in
response to the Alien and Sedition Acts, which generally prohibited speech critical
of the national government.28 The Resolutions were deeply influenced by
contemporary political strife; Republicans, including Jefferson and Madison,
believed that the Federalist-sponsored Acts were specifically designed to silence
Republican dissent.29 The key strategic decision made by the authors was to cast their
political opposition in constitutional terms, asserting that the Alien and Sedition Acts
were not only unwise but also unconstitutional. The authority to issue the Resolutions
purportedly stemmed from a state prerogative to nullify unconstitutional laws.30
Jefferson’s drafts were noticeably more combative than Madison’s31 and
constitute the more revealing portrait of the nullification doctrine.32 Relying on a

24. See infra notes 43, 47, 65, and accompanying text.
25. See Dinan, supra note 12, at 1641.
26. See, e.g., Jeff Taylor, States’ Fights, AM. CONSERVATIVE, July 2010, at 32. These
analogies, obviously, cast modern opposition efforts in a distinctly unflattering light. See, e.g.,
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2734
(2003) (noting that the “terms ‘interposition’ and ‘nullification’ are practically constitutional
profanities these days”); Sean Wilentz, States of Anarchy, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 29, 2010, at 5
(arguing that the “current rage for nullification is nothing less than another restatement, in a
different context, of musty neo-Confederate dogma”).
27. See Paulsen, supra note 26, at 2735.
28. Card, supra note 13, at 1801.
29. Robert B. McKay, “With All Deliberate Speed”: A Study of School Desegregation,
31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1025 (1956).
30. Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, reprinted in WOODS, supra
note 12, at 167, 169 (declaring nullification to be the “rightful remedy” for unconstitutional
acts by the federal government). The precise scope of this remedy, however, was subject to
dispute. See infra notes 32, 36.
31. Card, supra note 13, at 1803.
32. The Virginia Resolution does not explicitly assert the right to nullify federal
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compact theory of the Constitution—which views that document as a contract
between individual sovereigns33—the first of the two Kentucky Resolutions
contended “that whensoever the general government assumes undelegated powers,
its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force.”34 Independent state interpretive
authority originated from the simple proposition that “this government, created by
this compact, was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers
delegated to itself, since that would have made its discretion, and not the
Constitution, the measure of its powers.”35 The second resolution, characterized by
an even more strident tone, proclaimed that “the several states who formed that
[compact], being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge
of its infraction; . . . a nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts
done under colour of that instrument, is the rightful remedy.”36
The confrontation engendered by the Alien and Sedition Acts abated when the
Federalists lost power in the landslide election of 1800, rendering the Resolutions
moot.37 Ironically, however, nullification was invoked soon thereafter by the
Federalists in response to the conduct of the Jefferson administration.38 The subject
of the furor was the Embargo Acts,39 a series of bills enacted with the ostensible
purpose of imposing economic hardship on England and France.40 The Embargo Acts
not only severely suppressed maritime commerce but also authorized a host of
intrusive enforcement mechanisms;41 these features converged to outrage merchants
and delegates across the Northeast.42 The Massachusetts House of Representatives,
for instance, issued a report that declared the fourth Embargo Act “in many respects
unjust, oppressive and unconstitutional, and not legally binding on the citizens of this

legislation, though it does claim that states “have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose,
for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the
authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.” James Madison, Virginia Resolution,
reprinted in WOODS, supra note 12, at 147, 148.
33. See Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: Insights from the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 319 (1994); Stephen C. Neff,
Secession and Breach of Compact: The Law of Nature Meets the United States Constitution,
45 AKRON L. REV. 405, 413–15 (2012).
34. Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in WOODS, supra
note 12, at 157, 157.
35. Id. at 157–58.
36. Jefferson, supra note 30, at 169 (emphasis omitted). Whether Jefferson believed that
a single state could engage in nullification, or that nullification required collective action, is a
matter of continuing debate. See Moore, supra note 33, at 320.
37. See Card, supra note 13, at 1804.
38. O. Shane Balloun, The Disarming Nature of the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act: A
Constitutional Analysis of Wyoming’s Interposition Between Its Citizens and the Federal
Government, 11 WYO. L. REV. 201, 209 n.60 (2011).
39. Act of Apr. 25, 1808, ch. 66, 2 Stat. 499; Act of Mar. 12, 1808, ch. 33, 2 Stat. 473;
Act of Jan. 8, 1808, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 453; Act of Dec. 22, 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451.
40. Bradley D. Hays, A Place for Interposition? What John Taylor of Caroline and the
Embargo Crisis Have to Offer Regarding Resistance to the Bush Constitution, 67 MD. L. REV.
200, 210 (2007).
41. See id. at 211–12.
42. See WOODS, supra note 12, at 61.

622

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:613

state.”43 The Connecticut General Assembly passed a special resolution that not only
declared the Embargo Acts unconstitutional but also explicitly prohibited state officers
from assisting in their enforcement.44 In the face of widespread popular resistance,
Jefferson relented and the Republicans repealed the offensive legislation.45
The Nullification Crisis of 1832 illustrated both the deep theoretical complexity
and practical importance of nullification. In 1828, Congress passed what became
popularly known as the “Tariff of Abominations,” which was widely perceived by
those in the South as detrimental to their own agricultural interests and
disproportionately favorable to Northern manufacturing concerns.46 South Carolina
responded by passing an ordinance declaring the tariff “null, void, and no law, nor
binding upon this State, its officers or citizens.”47 The ordinance also threatened
secession in the event that any efforts were made to enforce the tariff.48 The federal
government responded swiftly and ferociously; President Andrew Jackson issued a
proclamation explicitly declaring nullification unconstitutional,49 and Congress
enacted the Force Bill to compel compliance.50 The Crisis was only narrowly averted
when Congress adopted a compromise tariff and South Carolina responded by
withdrawing its nullification statute.51
The history of the Nullification Crisis, as well as much of the intellectual baggage
associated with nullification as an instrument of practical politics, is heavily
intertwined with the writings and political machinations of then-Vice President John
Calhoun. Calhoun radically expanded the principles articulated in the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions.52 According to Calhoun, nullification suspended the
operation of a federal statute until a nationwide convention either rejected or ratified
the proposed nullification.53
Like Jefferson, Calhoun rested his views on a compact theory of the Constitution:
as an equal and sovereign party to the constitutional compact, each state retained the
authority to suspend its consent to national rule when the federal government
overstepped its delegated powers.54 A state’s right to judge whether federal action

43. Hays, supra note 40, at 213.
44. Id. at 214.
45. Id.
46. See Card, supra note 13, at 1804.
47. S.C., Ordinance To Nullify Certain Acts of the Congress of the United States, Purporting
To Be Laws Laying Duties and Imposts on the Importation of Foreign Commodities (Nov. 24,
1832), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ordnull.asp; see also Morse, supra
note 23, at 421. Interestingly, Madison argued that South Carolina’s nullification efforts were not
constitutionally justified. Claiborne, supra note 23, at 936.
48. Morse, supra note 23, at 421.
49. Card, supra note 13, at 1806.
50. Claiborne, supra note 23, at 936.
51. McKay, supra note 29, at 1036.
52. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 80.
53. See John Bryan Williams, How To Survive a Terrorist Attack: The Constitution’s
Majority Quorum Requirement and the Continuity of Congress, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1025, 1043 n.62 (2006); see also James H. Read, Madison’s Response to Nullification, in
JAMES MADISON: PHILOSOPHER, FOUNDER, AND STATESMAN 269, 270 (John R. Vile, William
D. Pederson & Frank J. Williams eds., 2008).
54. Nullification, in 2 CYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND OF
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transgressed the terms of the compact was “an essential attribute of sovereignty”; to
deny this right amounted to reducing the states “to a subordinate corporate condition.”55
Vesting a branch of the federal government with ultimate authority to determine the
scope of federal power would, according to this theory, effectively eradicate any limit
on that power.56 For Calhoun, nullification was implicit in the structure of American
government itself and a necessary check on majoritarian excess.57
Following the Nullification Crisis, the political valence of nullification switched
yet again, when it was invoked by Northern abolitionists to protect the rights of
escaped slaves. In 1850, Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act amidst intense
controversy.58 A host of states immediately enacted measures to impede its
enforcement.59 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin nullified the Act,60 as did the
legislatures of Massachusetts and Vermont.61 The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions
were referenced repeatedly by abolitionists agitating for interposition.62 Antislavery
states also sought to hamper the law’s effectiveness by prohibiting state officers from
assisting in its enforcement and denying federal officials the use of local jails.63
The most recent invocation of the doctrine occurred during the Massive
Resistance campaign undertaken by Southern states in response to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.64 Protesting states characterized
Brown as an unlawful judicial amendment to the Constitution and retaliated with a
wave of nullification statutes designed to neutralize its impact. Mississippi’s
response, which was typical, labeled Brown “unconstitutional, invalid and of no
lawful effect within . . . Mississippi.”65 Supporters of Massive Resistance frequently
cited the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, as well as the theoretical arguments
articulated by Calhoun.66 The Supreme Court definitively rejected nullification
during this period, establishing judicial hegemony as a broad matter in Cooper v.
Aaron67 and dismissing nullification specifically in United States v. Louisiana.68
According to the Louisiana Court, “The conclusion is clear that interposition is not

THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1050,

1051 (John J. Lalor ed., 1883).
55. JOHN C. CALHOUN, Exposition and Protest, in UNION AND LIBERTY 311, 348 (Ross M.
Lence ed., 1992).
56. Id.
57. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 81.
58. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462; see also Morse, supra note 23, at 422.
59. See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE
NORTH, 1780-1861, at 166–85 (1974) (describing Northern responses to the Fugitive Slave Act).
60. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854).
61. Morse, supra note 23, at 422–23.
62. WOODS, supra note 12, at 81–83.
63. Taylor, supra note 26. These forms of sub-nullification resistance are echoed in many
of today’s opposition efforts. See infra Part II.C.
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65. Card, supra note 13, at 1807 (quoting William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court
by State Officials: A Case Study of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV.
483, 493 (2002)).
66. Id.
67. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
68. 364 U.S. 500 (1960).
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a constitutional doctrine. If taken seriously, it is illegal defiance of constitutional
authority.”69
II. TAXONOMY OF STATE OPPOSITION LAWS
Contemporary state efforts to resist or derail federal policy take a variety of forms.
This Part categorizes state opposition laws according to the specific purposes they
are facially designed to serve.70 Each subpart summarizes a particular category of
legislation, provides concrete examples of statutes exemplifying the class, and
concludes with a brief preemption analysis.
A. Statutes that Express an Opinion on Federal Policy
Opposition statutes often do no more than simply express the state’s position on
a particular issue. In some cases, these laws merely reassert, as a general matter, the
state’s exclusive jurisdiction over those subject matters not explicitly delegated to
the federal government by the Constitution. In other instances, they serve as vehicles
for a state (or state subdivision, such as a locality) to express its views on a particular
federal policy. Regardless of the tenor or specificity of the enactment, however, the
statutes in this category are uniformly intended to be merely expressive in nature.
They neither create rights or obligations in state citizens nor affect the operation of
any regulatory apparatus.71
Many expressive statutes simply reaffirm the policy of state autonomy embodied
in the Tenth Amendment.72 Utah’s Tenth Amendment Resolution, which exemplifies
this type of enactment, provides in part:
[T]he Legislature of the state of Utah, the Governor concurring therein,
acknowledge and reaffirm residuary and inviolable sovereignty of the
state of Utah under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States over all powers not otherwise enumerated and granted to
the federal government by the Constitution of the United States.73
The Utah bill concludes by “strongly” urging the repeal of certain national legislation
and calling for its own transmission to both the federal government and sister states.74

69. Id. at 501 (quoting Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 926 (E.D.
La. 1960)).
70. The Tenth Amendment Center provides legislative tracking on opposition efforts
nationwide. The 10th Amendment Nullification Movement, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER,
http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/the-10th-amendment-movement/comment-page-9/.
71. Some statutes, of course, comprise a mixture of expressive and functional
components. This subpart pertains not only to statutes that are entirely expressive but also to
those purely expressive clauses embedded in otherwise functional legislation.
72. The text of the Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST amend. X.
73. S.C.R. 3, 2010 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010).
74. Id.
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Other expressive resolutions target a particular national policy for criticism.
Following the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, for
instance, the Board of Commissioners of Fremont County, Colorado, issued a
resolution condemning several of the bill’s provisions.75 In similar fashion, following
passage of the Patriot Act, the City of Austin, Texas, issued a resolution criticizing
elements of the bill and reaffirming its commitment “to the protection of civil rights
and civil liberties for all of its residents . . . .”76 The resolution further stated that
certain provisions of the Act “threaten fundamental rights and liberties” and
requested Texas representatives to actively seek their repeal.77
Expressive pronouncements of this nature are not subject to federal preemption.
They do not interfere with the operation of any federal law;78 indeed, they do not
purport to have any legal effect whatsoever. They represent nothing more than
formalized expressions of protest against allegedly unconstitutional national policies.
This type of purely expressive enactment may even be affirmatively protected from
preemption by the First Amendment.79
B. Statutes that Exempt Federally Prohibited Conduct from State Law Penalties
States often choose to permit, as a matter of state law, conduct prohibited at the
federal level. This choice can take one of two forms. First, the state may simply
decline to penalize certain conduct under state law, regardless of its status under
federal law. This situation, which is often evidenced by statutory silence, occurs with
remarkable frequency. Since federal and state criminal laws are not congruent, there
exists a wide swath of behavior subject to federal but not state prosecution. In this
respect, a state’s mere failure to prohibit particular activities criminalized at the
federal level does not necessarily bespeak disapproval of national policy.
In some instances, however, a state’s decision to refrain from criminalizing
conduct may represent a form of resistance to federal law. Such opposition is
signified when the state ostentatiously decriminalizes a federally prohibited
activity,80 or goes even further and affirmatively legitimizes that activity by
providing various regulatory and legal protections to those who engage in it. In these
cases, although the federal prohibition remains in effect, the more permissive state
regime exists as a background rule that operates to the extent the federal government
fails to enforce its own laws. This regulatory approach, which conspicuously

75. Carie Canterbury, County Passes Due Process Resolution, CANON CITY DAILY REC.
(Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.canoncitydailyrecord.com/ci_19814522.
76. CITY OF AUSTIN, TEX., RES. NO. 030807-37 (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org
/national-security/austin-tx-resolution.
77. Id.
78. See infra notes 125–126 and accompanying text.
79. See Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free Speech:
The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (1999).
80. A state’s decision to decriminalize may be “ostentatious,” for instance, if it occurs in
the midst of a national debate on the issue. See, e.g., Keith Coffman & Nicole Neroulias,
Colorado, Washington First States To Legalize Recreational Pot, REUTERS, Nov. 7, 2012,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usa-marijuana-legalization
-idUSBRE8A602D20121107.
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signifies the state’s preferred alternative to national prohibition, constitutes a form
of passive dissent to federal policy.81
Medical marijuana laws82 are arguably the most widespread, politically salient,
and practically significant example of this genus of statutes. Under the federal
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the cultivation, possession, and distribution of
marijuana are prohibited.83 In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court, faced with a
more permissive state law regime, categorically upheld the application of the CSA
to medical marijuana.84 Nevertheless, several states have persisted in declining to
criminalize—as a matter of state law—medical marijuana and have instead
promulgated detailed regulations to govern its use.85 These states typically provide a
list of qualifying conditions, require the patient to obtain a doctor’s recommendation,
and regulate the amount of marijuana that may be possessed as well as the places in
which it may be consumed.86 Some states even grant patients the right to recover any
marijuana that has been wrongfully seized by state law enforcement officers,87 while
others provide special legal protections to registered users of the drug. Oregon, for
instance, prohibits landlords from terminating a tenant’s lease on the basis of the
tenant’s use of medical marijuana in accordance with state law.88
The preemption analysis for this class of statutes is heavily informed by the
anticommandeering rule established by the Supreme Court in New York v. United
States.89 According to the New York Court, “[E]ven where Congress has the authority
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the
power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”90 Consequently,
the federal government may not oblige a state to criminalize—or preclude it from
decriminalizing—marijuana use.91 Regulatory provisions attendant upon state

81. See Balloun, supra note 38, at 232 (describing state medical marijuana laws as a form
of “passive” state interposition).
82. Recreational marijuana laws obviously raise similar issues. This Article focuses on
medical marijuana statutes for the simple reason that they are more common and thus provide
a greater number of data points.
83. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1236, 1247, 1249, 1260. This prohibition is subject to certain minor exceptions not
relevant here.
84. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
85. The list of states with medical marijuana statutes continues to evolve. Between 1996
and 2011, sixteen states legalized the use of marijuana for medical purposes. Dinan, supra
note 12, at 1647.
86. Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’
Overlooked Power To Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1428–30 (2009).
87. Id. at 1430.
88. OR. REV. STAT. § 90.396(1)(f)(B)(i) (2013).
89. 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). For a comprehensive analysis of the intersection of
preemption doctrine and the anticommandeering rule in this context, see generally Schwartz,
supra note 12.
90. New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
91. See Mikos, supra note 86, at 1423–24; see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646
(9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“[P]reventing the state from repealing an existing
law is no different from forcing it to pass a new one; in either case, the state is being forced to
regulate conduct that it prefers to leave unregulated.”).
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decriminalization, such as the requirement of doctor recommendations, are similarly
exempt from preemption insofar as they function merely to separate legal from illegal
conduct under state law.92 Mechanisms of this variety simply define the contours of
the state regime that operates as the background rule to federal prohibition.
State laws that provide affirmative protections to marijuana users, however, are
more susceptible to invalidation.93 The CSA expressly disclaims field preemption
but does mandate that a state statute be preempted if “there is a positive conflict
between [the state and federal laws] so that the two cannot consistently stand
together.”94 Thus, a state law that insulates a marijuana user from eviction may be
preempted to the extent the statute aids and abets a violation of the CSA.95 Similarly,
a requirement that a state officer return wrongfully seized marijuana to its original
owner may be preempted because it requires law enforcement to “distribute” a
controlled substance.96 None of these observations, however, trenches on the
fundamental principle that a state may legalize, as a matter of state law, conduct
otherwise prohibited at the federal level.
C. Statutes that Bar State Officials from Implementing Federal Law
Statutes that bar state officials from implementing federal law are conceptually
analogous to the statutes described in the previous subpart: both simply decline to
employ the state enforcement apparatus against particular activities. By explicitly
prohibiting its officers from assisting in the enforcement of a specific federal law, a
state unmistakably codifies its objection to national policy. These statutes possess a
substantial historical pedigree; many Northern states, for instance, barred their
officers from assisting in the implementation of the Fugitive Slave Act.97
A paradigmatic example of this class of laws is the Wyoming Firearms Freedom
Act.98 The Act provides that any firearm manufactured in Wyoming that remains

92. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 646 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“By precluding doctors, on pain
of losing their DEA registration, from making a recommendation that would legalize the patients’
conduct under state law, the federal policy makes it impossible for the state to exempt the use of
medical marijuana from the operation of its drug laws. In effect, the federal government is forcing
the state to keep medical marijuana illegal.”); San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr.
3d 461, 482 (Ct. App. 2008); Mikos, supra note 86, at 1455–56.
93. See, e.g., Dana Kelly, Bringing the Green to Green: Would the Legalization of
Marijuana in California Prevent the Environmental Destruction Caused by Illegal Farms?,
18 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 95, 111–12 (2012).
94. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).
95. Mikos, supra note 86, at 1456–57. The likelihood of aiding and abetting liability being
imposed on these facts is subject to dispute. Cf. United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887–88
(7th Cir. 1991) (exploring the contours of aiding and abetting liability in the context of the
War on Drugs).
96. Mikos, supra note 86, at 1459.
97. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also supra note 44 and accompanying
text (similar state legislation enacted in opposition to the Embargo Acts).
98. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-404 to 6-8-406 (2013). Another example is a recent wave of
proposed bills that would bar state officials from implementing the ACA. See Jacob Gershman,
Bills Proposed in Several States Would Nullify Affordable Care Act, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan.
17, 2014, 10:53 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/01/17/bills-proposed-in-several-states
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within the physical borders of the state is not subject to federal gun regulations.99
Wyoming’s asserted authority over domestic firearms is predicated on a narrow
reading of the Commerce Clause: the Act explicitly declares that locally
manufactured guns that remain exclusively within the state have not moved in
“interstate commerce.”100 As relevant here, the Act prohibits state officers from
violating its provisions by assisting in the enforcement of contrary federal law.101
Statutes of this variety occasionally qualify their scope with constitutional
language, prohibiting state participation in federal enforcement efforts only where
those efforts, in the judgment of the state, would be unconstitutional. Virginia’s
response to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)—which arguably
authorizes the indefinite detention of American citizens102—exemplifies this
particular variant. Virginia’s statute provides that no state officer
shall knowingly aid . . . in the detention of any citizen pursuant to 50
U.S.C. § 1541 as provided by the [NDAA] . . . if such aid would
knowingly place [the officer] in violation of the United States
Constitution, the Constitution of Virginia, any provision of the Code of
Virginia, any act of the General Assembly, or any regulation of the
Virginia Administrative Code.103
The inclusion of the federal Constitution as an independent basis for refusing to assist
in the detention of citizens implies that, at least in some circumstances, the state’s
judgment of whether an enforcement effort complies with the Constitution will
diverge from the judgment made by the federal government.104 In other words, the
statute implicitly deems certain actions sanctioned by the NDAA unconstitutional.105
Like the statutes examined in the previous subpart, these laws are protected from
preemption by the anticommandeering rule recognized in New York.106 In Printz v.
United States, the Court elaborated on the New York doctrine in the enforcement
context, declaring that “the Federal Government may not compel the States to
implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”107

-would-nullify-affordable-care-act/.
99. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-404(a). The implications of this particular aspect of the
statute—which purports to nullify federal law—are addressed in more detail in Part II.E.
100. § 6-8-404(a).
101. Id. § 6-8-405(a).
102. See Natasha Lennard, Obama Signs NDAA 2014, Indefinite Detention Remains,
SALON (Dec. 27, 2013, 7:38 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/12/27/obama_signs_ndaa
_2014_indefinite_detention_remains/.
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-614.2:1 (2014).
104. Cf. Althouse, supra note 12, at 1255 (noting that a local resolution which limits local
police participation in Patriot Act enforcement constitutes “a robust interpretation of the meaning
of constitutional rights that implicitly denounces the central purpose of the PATRIOT Act”).
105. Id. (making a similar argument with respect to laws passed in opposition to the Patriot Act).
106. For an argument that the implications of the anticommandeering rule here are not as
clear as this Article suggests, see generally Schwartz, supra note 12.
107. 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997). Even prior to the formulation of the anticommandeering
rule, the Supreme Court in the 1850s reached a similar conclusion regarding Northern laws
that prohibited state officers from assisting in the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.

2015]

THE NEW STATE SOVEREIGNTY MOVEMENT

629

Although state officers may not interfere with a federal agent’s performance of his
official duties, Congress cannot require state officers to affirmatively assist in the
execution of federal law.108 Importantly, the Printz rule is categorical: the Court made
clear that in this context “a ‘balancing’ analysis is inappropriate.”109 “It is the very
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no comparative
assessment of the various interests can overcome that fundamental defect.”110
The federal government’s inability to commandeer the states, however, does not
necessarily indicate that a state may decline to provide assistance for any reason it
chooses. Racially or religiously motivated refusals to aid federal law enforcement may
be subject to constitutional constraints, for instance.111 Most modern prohibitions on
assistance, however, do not implicate the Constitution’s equality guarantees. These
statutes are instead typically predicated on expansive readings of constitutional rights
or narrow constructions of federal power.112 The former almost certainly constitute a
permissible basis for withholding state assistance; it is widely accepted that federal
rights constitute a floor rather than a ceiling with respect to state conduct.113
The latter also likely fall within the purview of the Printz doctrine—even if the
Supreme Court fails to endorse (or even rejects) the constitutional position adopted
by the state. Unlike a racially or religiously motivated law, a statute of this variety
does not contravene any constitutional prohibition. In the absence of constitutional
infirmity, the categorical nature of the Printz rule suggests that a state’s motivation
for declining to participate in a federal program is irrelevant. Consequently, states
are probably justified in withholding assistance on the basis of constitutional
objections that would not succeed in federal court.114 The anticommandeering rule

Mikos, supra note 86, at 1449 n.107.
108. It is a separate question whether the federal government could preempt state laws
constraining the ability of state officers to assist in enforcing federal laws, thereby freeing willing
state officers to provide assistance without compelling them to do so. For a discussion of this
issue, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law To Free State and
Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1211–13 (1999).
109. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932.
110. Id. (emphasis in original).
111. State action (or inaction) that is unobjectionable on its face may be constitutionally
suspect if motivated by an impermissible purpose. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 107 (1968) (invalidating, on the grounds that it was religiously motivated, a state law
prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public school).
112. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-9004 (2011) (effectively barring, on the basis of a
narrow construction of federal power, state employees from assisting in the enforcement of the
ACA); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-614.2:1 (2014) (precluding state employees from assisting in the
implementation of the NDAA when doing so would violate a suspect’s constitutional rights).
113. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (recognizing
“the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution”); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986) (“As is
well known, federal preservation of civil liberties is a minimum, which the states may surpass
so long as there is no clash with federal law.”).
114. See Althouse, supra note 12, at 1256.
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thus effectively permits a degree of autonomy on the part of state officials in
interpreting the federal constitution.115
D. Statutes that Provide for Enhanced Enforcement of Federal Law
Many state statutes incorporate federal substantive standards but establish
enforcement mechanisms more strenuous than those approved by the President or
Congress. These enactments often include provisions that expand the discretion of state
officers to enforce federal law or attach additional state penalties to federal violations.
Consequently, these statutes reflect a degree of dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of
federal enforcement policy rather than with federal substantive policy per se.
Statutes of this variety are prevalent in the immigration context. Arizona’s
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act116 represents the most
salient recent example. Arizona’s bill, which relied on federal law for its definition
of alienage, was intended to augment federal efforts to curtail illegal immigration.117
Section 3 of the Act rendered it a state misdemeanor to fail to comply with federal
registration requirements.118 Section 5(C) prohibited undocumented aliens from
working or seeking employment in the state.119 Section 6 authorized state officers to
make warrantless arrests of individuals the officer had probable cause to believe had
committed an offense that rendered them removable.120 Finally, Section 2(B) required
an officer who lawfully detained an individual to make a reasonable attempt to
determine the person’s immigration status if the officer had reasonable suspicion that
the person was an undocumented alien.121
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court evaluated the validity of these
provisions and determined that federal law preempted Sections 3, 5(C), and 6, but
that 2(B) survived.122 The instructiveness of the ruling is limited, however, by its
heavy reliance on the national government’s “exclusive authority over foreign
affairs.”123 As a result, the opinion’s reasoning is probably of minimal relevance
outside the immigration context.124
The preemption of state efforts to augment federal enforcement in other circumstances
will depend on one of two legal standards. Although certain state schemes may be field
preempted, this category of preemption analysis is rarely invoked by the modern Court.125

115. See id. at 1259–60.
116. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch . 113, 2010 Ariz.
Sess. Laws 450 (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11,
13, 23, 28, 41).
117. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 note (2012 & Supp. 2013).
118. Id. at § 13-1509.
119. Id. at § 13-2928(C).
120. Id. at § 13-3883(A)(5).
121. Id. at § 11-1051(B).
122. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503, 2505, 2507, 2510 (2012).
123. The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 327, 330 (2012).
124. An increasing number of states have adopted statutes modeled after or related to
Arizona’s approach. See Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption, and the Lost
Legacy of McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 157 n.14 (2012).
125. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227 (2000) (“The Court has
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Preemption will instead typically turn on whether, in the canonical language of conflict
preemption, state action “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”126
Under this standard, the Court has repeatedly invalidated state penalties attached
to federal violations, especially when the additional state remedy upsets the particular
balancing of costs and benefits enshrined by the federal statute.127 State efforts
simply to enforce federal law, however—without the provision of any additional
remedies—occupy less certain legal terrain. Modern case law fails to provide a
definitive, transsubstantive rule for addressing this particular issue.128 The status of
these state efforts likely depends on the rationale underlying the particular federal
enforcement policy they are intended to supplement. When federal enforcement levels
stem merely from resource constraints, it is entirely possible that state assistance will
pose no obstacle to achieving congressional purposes. If federal “underenforcement”
is a result of careful policy calibration by the President or Congress, however, state
supplementation may disrupt that balance and therefore be preempted.129
E. Statutes that Purport to Nullify Federal Law
Many opposition statutes declare that a particular federal law, or one of its
applications, is unconstitutional and therefore void. Other statutes implicitly nullify
federal law by outlawing the specific policy choice that it enshrines. Both variations
tend to phrase their objections in the language of reserved and enumerated powers.
Although statutes of this variety occasionally include a mechanism for preventing the
enforcement of federal law, those that do are reserved for later consideration. The laws
addressed in this subpart, which lack affirmative enforcement provisions, merely
purport to provide a rule of decision for courts.
Utah’s Firearms Freedom Act is a prototypical example of a statute designed to
nullify a particular application of federal law. The Utah Act, echoing historical

grown increasingly hesitant to read implicit field-preemption clauses into federal statutes.”).
126. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The other form of conflict preemption—
triggered when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility,” Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes
Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)—typically will not
be implicated by statutes that merely seek to supplement federal enforcement efforts.
127. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001) (holding
that states may not provide supplemental remedies for fraud committed against the Food and
Drug Administration); Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475
U.S. 282, 288 (1986) (holding that supplemental state remedies to the National Labor
Relations Act are preempted).
128. James A. Kraehenbuehl, Lessons from the Past: How the Antebellum Fugitive Slave
Debate Informs State Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1491
(2011) (noting that “modern preemption case law does not address the specific enforcement
question asked by jurisdictions of overenforcement like Arizona: To what extent can a state
overenforce a federal law by using state resources to arrest, detain, and prosecute people in
violation of the federal law?”).
129. Cf. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74 (2000) (finding that
sanctions adopted by Massachusetts targeting Myanmar were preempted on the ground that they
upset the careful policy calibration made by Congress in enacting sanctions at the federal level).
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theorists, explicitly characterizes the Constitution as a contract between the federal
government and the sovereign states.130 With this constitutional vision131 as its
foundation, the Act provides:
In reviewing any matter covered by this chapter, a court shall consider
the following: . . . A personal firearm, a firearm action or receiver, a
firearm accessory, or ammunition that is manufactured commercially or
privately in the state to be used or sold within the state is not subject to
federal law or federal regulation, including registration, under the
authority of congress to regulate interstate commerce.132
As a result, the regulation of such firearms is reserved to the state under the Tenth
Amendment.133 Although the Utah Act does not explicitly reference any particular
federal statute, such as the National Firearms Act,134 its unmistakable intention is to
nullify legislation that infringes state control of the intrastate gun trade.
Virginia’s response to the ACA exemplifies those statutes that outlaw a particular
substantive policy adopted by the federal government. The Virginia Healthcare
Freedom Act provides that “[n]o resident of this Commonwealth . . . shall be required
to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage except as required by
a court or the Department of Social Services where an individual is named a party in
a judicial or administrative proceeding.”135 Although it does not reference the ACA,
the plain purpose of the Virginia Act is to nullify the individual mandate provision of
that law.136 As the related litigation indicates, Virginia’s bill is predicated on a
constitutional claim that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’ authority under the
Commerce Clause.137
The juxtaposition of the Utah and Virginia bills illustrates an important analytical
point. On its face, the Utah legislation is purely declaratory: it does not endeavor to
create any legal rights or obligations but merely recognizes certain constraints on
federal power (allegedly) imposed by the Constitution. In contrast, the Virginia law
purports to create an immunity138: it is intended to supply, by its own force, a rule of
decision for state courts. The difficulty, of course, is that states are incapable of
limiting federal power by edict. The immunity created by the Virginia bill will only
be operative if the Constitution renders conflicting federal law invalid. In that case,
the bill would be superfluous, insofar as an unconstitutional federal law fails to
supply a rule of decision regardless of whether the state says as much.

130. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5b-102 (LexisNexis 2010).
131. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, State Standing To Challenge Ultra Vires Federal Action:
The Health Care Cases and Beyond, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 322–25 (2012)
(discussing and criticizing the compact theory of the Constitution).
132. § 53-5b-102.
133. Id.
134. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934).
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2014).
136. Timothy S. Jost, Can the States Nullify Health Care Reform?, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED.
869, 869 (2010).
137. See Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 601 (E.D. Va. 2010).
138. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 55 (1913) (explaining the concept of an immunity).
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Thus, despite their differing formal structures, neither piece of legislation is
capable of establishing immunity from federal obligations. The effect of each is
ultimately reducible to the viability of its constitutional arguments. Although the two
statutes are analytically distinct, they are addressed together in this subpart because
they are identical in both functional and rhetorical effect.139 They are not included in
subpart II.A., which encompasses purely expressive laws, because their plain text does
purport to alter the legal relations that exist under current federal law.
Statutes that declare federal law invalid represent the modern incarnation of classic
nullification measures.140 If the federal legislation they target is itself constitutional,
these statutes will be uniformly preempted under the Supremacy Clause.141 Because
their operative effects are largely congruent with their constitutional claims, such
statutes cannot survive judicial decisions that reject the constitutional interpretations
upon which they are predicated. In this context it is important to note that a state or
federal court engaged in determining the validity of federal law will not be bound by
the nullifying legislature’s judgment of constitutionality.142
F. Statutes that Hinder Federal Law Enforcement
The most combative efforts to oppose the enforcement of federal law take the
form of statutes threatening federal executive officers with criminal punishment for
acts taken contrary to state policy. Statutes in this class typically nullify federal law
and further provide that any officer who attempts to enforce the nullified law will be
subject to state penalties. Although several such statutes have been proposed in
recent years,143 their actual passage is relatively rare.
The Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act represents one of the few enacted statutes
penalizing federal agents simply for fulfilling their official responsibilities. It
provides that any official “who enforces or attempts to enforce” any federal law upon
a firearm that “is manufactured commercially or privately in Wyoming and that
remains exclusively within the borders of Wyoming shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and, upon conviction, shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than one (1) year,
a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both.”144
The Wyoming provision is predicated on a narrow reading of Congress’ power
under the Commerce Clause, which the state contends does not authorize regulation

139. The rhetorical tenor of a nullification statute is important because it is instrumental in
shaping the statute’s tendency to promote divisive sectionalism and undermine national unity.
See infra notes 331–343 and accompanying text.
140. See generally supra Part I.
141. Leonard, supra note 12, at 117.
142. The Oath Clause requires both federal and state judges to uphold the Constitution
faithfully: “all . . . judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
143. See, e.g., S.B. 1178, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (declaring that goods
produced and sold exclusively within the state are beyond the authority of the federal
commerce power and providing that any federal agent attempting to enforce federal law in
contravention of the statute will be guilty of a felony).
144. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-405(b) (2013).
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of the intrastate manufacture and transfer of firearms.145 According to this theory,
any federal law that justifies a violation of the Act is itself unconstitutional. A federal
officer seeking to enforce such a law is therefore acting ultra vires. Consequently,
the state is (allegedly) entitled to respond to the federal agent’s conduct in the same
manner it would respond to the actions of a private lawbreaker.
As the previous subpart noted, statutes that purport to nullify federal law will be
preempted insofar as the targeted legislation is itself deemed constitutional.146
Similarly, statutes that actively interfere with the enforcement of a valid federal law
“stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress” and thus will be invalidated under standard conflict
preemption principles.147
This latter conclusion is arguably buttressed by the doctrine of Supremacy Clause
immunity, recognized in In re Neagle,148 which immunizes a federal officer from
state prosecution if his allegedly criminal conduct was both authorized by federal
law and necessary and proper to the performance of his official duties.149 It is unclear,
however, whether Neagle shields an officer from criminal liability if his conduct was
authorized by what is later determined to be an unconstitutional federal law. A court
faced with this scenario might draw an analogy to qualified immunity in the § 1983
context and grant the officer immunity unless he violated a clearly established
constitutional prohibition.150 The precedents and scholarship on the scope of
Supremacy Clause immunity, however, are notoriously sparse.151 For purposes of
subsequent analysis, it is sufficient merely to recognize that most statutes in this
category will be overridden by federal law.
III. PURPOSES SERVED BY STATE OPPOSITION LAWS
This Part provides a taxonomy of the various purposes that opposition statutes
may serve, apart from those expressed in their text and despite any constraints
imposed by federal law. Both preempted and nonpreempted statutes, for instance,
may produce significant political ramifications, as well as a host of indirect legal
consequences. The chief purposes furthered by opposition statutes fall into three main

145. Id. at § 6-8-404(a). This narrow reading, obviously, is in tension with the broad
reading given to the Clause by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
22 (2005) (concluding that the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana does fall
within the scope of the Commerce Clause).
146. See Balloun, supra note 38, at 222 (“[T]he main thrust of any argument Wyoming
raises before the federal judiciary must be that the federal law in conflict with the Act is illegal
and void.”); Jost, supra note 136, at 869.
147. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
148. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
149. Seth P. Waxman, Federalism, Law Enforcement, and the Supremacy Clause: The
Strange Case of Ruby Ridge, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 141, 145–46 (2002).
150. See id. at 150; Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity?
Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2239–
42 (2003).
151. See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 150, at 2200.
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classes: expressing dissent, influencing adjudication, and affecting federal policy.152
Each class can be further subdivided into a cluster of related functions. The subparts
below explore the three major categories and their various permutations in detail.
A. Expressing Dissent
One of the primary aims advanced by opposition statutes is the expression of
dissent. Purely declaratory resolutions obviously serve this purpose. Laws that
exempt federally prohibited conduct from state penalties, as well as legislation that
bars state officers from enforcing federal law,153 also communicate disapproval.
Even many preempted statutes, however—such as those that declare federal law
void—remain capable of fulfilling a similar expressive function.154 Communicating
dissent is one of the most pervasive and important purposes served by the modern
generation of sovereignty laws.
States, like other political organizations, serve as effective institutions for rallying
and channeling opposition. In enacting statutes condemning federal policy, states are
capable of uniting disparate groups and providing a concrete, unified platform for
resistance.155 These efforts frequently provide a voice to dissenters who might
otherwise be silenced156 and bring public salience to issues that might otherwise be
submerged.157 As Alexander Hamilton observed, the states “will constantly have
their attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough,
if anything improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and . . . to be the
VOICE . . . of their discontent.”158
State acts of protest generate a wealth of ripple effects. They serve to codify
dissent and thus provide Congress with valuable information on the geographical

152. These categories are obviously permeable: the expression of dissent, for instance, may
impact federal policy. Nevertheless, they represent a useful, functional tool for analyzing the
real-world effects of state resistance.
153. The anticommandeering rule, which enables states to withhold assistance from federal
enforcement efforts, may serve as the federalism analog of the First Amendment rule against
compelled speech: the former protects the right of states to decline to express support for federal
positions that they oppose, just as the latter protects the right of individuals to decline to express
support for governmental positions they oppose. Hills, supra note 12, at 906–15.
154. Leonard, supra note 12, at 167.
155. See Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in
the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1285 (2004); Hays, supra note 40,
at 205–06.
156. Leonard, supra note 12, at 164; see also Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN.
L. REV. 317, 403–04 (1997); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Rhetoric Hits the Road: State
Challenges to the Affordable Care Act Implementation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 785 (2012).
157. Card, supra note 13, at 1826; see also Leonard, supra note 12, at 167–68.
158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton). Like committees of correspondence
during the Revolutionary War, states may “open a correspondence and generally overcome
collective action problems that might otherwise hinder opposition to federal policies through
such mechanisms as hortatory resolutions and coordination of plans of resistance.” Hills, supra
note 12, at 915 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this sense, states will be “so many
sentinels” over the activities of the federal government. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander
Hamilton).
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popularity of certain policies.159 They may also help to educate the public regarding
both the implementation process associated with complicated federal programs and
the particular issues of federalism and personal liberty that those programs raise.160
Finally, opposition statutes may pressure the state’s congressional representatives to
adopt a political stance similar to that taken by the state legislature.161 As a result,
state dissent occasionally exerts a gravitational effect on national discussion: during
reauthorization hearings for the Patriot Act, for example, representatives repeatedly
cited state resolutions opposing the bill.162
Opposition statutes also provide an important expressive outlet for constituencies
defeated at the national level.163 Antifederal resolutions and other state-level projects
offer “near-term, feasible targets and the possibility of occasional victories,” even if
national success is doubtful.164 States’ rights activists, for instance, are far more
likely to secure passage of an anti-ACA nullification resolution in their state than to
achieve repeal of the ACA in Congress.165 Plausible objectives of this variety enable
ongoing mobilization of political opposition despite bleak prospects nationally.166
Such state-level efforts functionally expand the opportunity for political
participation: a state’s willingness to enter a national debate provides constituents
with an alternative forum for voicing their opinions on issues of federal policy.167
State laws keyed to national controversies provide potential benefits not only to
disaffected voters but also to dissenting politicians. By maintaining the public
salience of divisive federal programs like healthcare reform, politicians in minority
states are able to effectively capitalize on their own opposition to those policies.168
Voting for a sovereignty bill enables a state politician to derive political capital from
a national debate in which he plays no direct role, while simultaneously signaling his
ideological commitments to constituents.169 By positioning the state as a figure in the
national conversation, the state politician is equally able to portray himself as a figure
in the national conversation, thereby attracting the votes of constituents who share
his views on that particular issue.170

159. Leonard, supra note 12, at 165–66.
160. Id. at 162–63.
161. See Card, supra note 13, at 1824–25.
162. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 12, at 1280 n.85. See infra Part III.C for a
comprehensive discussion of the effect of state resistance on federal policymaking.
163. Cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1081
(2014) (arguing that states “check the federal government by channeling partisan conflict
through federalism’s institutional framework”).
164. Christopher W. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 193, 218 (2011).
165. Id. at 219.
166. Id. at 219, 221; see also Hunter, supra note 14, at 720.
167. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Role of State Resistance
in Health Care Decision-Making, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 112 (2011).
168. Card, supra note 13, at 1826.
169. Cf. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 163, at 1090 (“Instead of representing distinctively
state interests against the distinctively national interests of the federal government, states may
participate in substantive controversies that are national in scope.”).
170. Leonard, supra note 12, at 165. Recent scholarship indicates that local politics, in part
as a result of voter ignorance, frequently operates largely in the shadow of national politics.
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The final and arguably most significant expressive function served by opposition
statutes is the modification of social norms. Resolutions that denounce federal policy
galvanize and amplify dissent, thereby shaping public opinion. Statutes that exempt
federally prohibited conduct from state penalties, however, operate on a more
fundamental level by altering the public’s moral and social perceptions of certain
primary conduct. Social norms are the product of a confluence of complex forces,
including law,171 which is capable of both communicating nascent norms and
simultaneously entrenching those norms.172 Law is an important element in fashioning
the public’s perception of the desirability and propriety of certain types of conduct.173
When a state sanctions a particular activity, it implicitly asserts that the activity is at
least tolerable both from the perspective of the authorities and other citizens.174 As a
result, state statutes that permit conduct otherwise prohibited by federal law have the
capacity to lessen the social stigma such conduct normally invites.175
Changing mores in the medical marijuana context exemplify this effect.
Permitting the use of marijuana as a palliative has had a significant impact on public
perceptions of its morality and social acceptability: “Simply by allowing their
residents to use marijuana for medical purposes, the states have arguably fostered
more tolerant attitudes toward the practice, making it seem more compassionate, less
dangerous, and less wicked, thereby removing or softening the personal and societal
reproach that once suppressed medical use of the drug.”176
Statutes of this variety also interact with norms regarding obedience to law. State
legalization reduces the moral dissonance experienced by those who desire to use
marijuana for medical purposes but also desire to obey legal commands.177 This is
particularly true if, as some have argued, citizens perceive the state as a more

David Schleicher, All Politics Is National, ATLANTIC (July 13, 2012, 12:13 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/07/all-politics-is-national/259789/ (“Most
votes in state legislative elections turns [sic] on impressions we develop about national
politics—we punish and reward state officials largely for what Congress and the president do,
rather than for what they do themselves.”).
171. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2026 (1996).
172. Whether law primarily communicates or creates norms is a matter of ongoing debate.
See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV.
1603, 1627 (2000) (noting that “whether norms are created or modified as a result of a legal rule
is context-dependent and, under the current state of our understanding, unknown”).
173. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1990) (exploring the preference-shaping
capacity of criminal laws).
174. Mikos, supra note 86, at 1476 (noting that “citizens demand laws that comport with
community norms, and lawmakers, subject to constraints such as majority rule, respond by
supplying such laws”).
175. Id. at 1475 (“On one view of the legislative process, lawmakers can shape social
norms by manipulating whether society condemns or condones a given behavior, similar to
the way they can shape personal beliefs about that behavior.”).
176. Id. at 1424–25; see also Sunstein, supra note 171, at 2032 (noting that laws “have an
important effect in signaling appropriate behavior and in inculcating the expectation of social
opprobrium and, hence, shame in those who deviate from the announced norm”).
177. Mikos, supra note 86, at 1472–74.
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legitimate repository of authority than the federal government and thus are more
willing to accept state directives as indicative of their true legal obligations.178 State
leniency may thus enable citizens to engage in federally prohibited activities without
sacrificing their sense of legal duty.
B. Influencing Adjudication
Sovereignty laws can also have a significant effect on constitutional adjudication,
at all stages of the judicial process: they may catalyze private lawsuits, trigger standing
for purposes of federal jurisdiction, and even influence the content of substantive
doctrine. As with the expressive functions described in the previous subpart, federal
preemption will not preclude a statute from serving this purpose. The following
analysis explores the potential impact of sovereignty laws at each stage of litigation.
As a threshold matter, opposition statutes may encourage state residents to bring
suits challenging the offensive federal law. State legislation condemning a particular
enactment implicitly suggests to potential plaintiffs that they will enjoy the support
of the state should they choose to challenge that enactment in court. Some states even
make this promise of support explicit. Idaho’s Healthcare Freedom Act, for instance,
declares that “every person within the state of Idaho is and shall be free to choose or
decline to choose any mode of securing health care services without penalty”179 and
requires the attorney general to take action “in the defense or prosecution of rights
protected under this act.”180 In other cases, backers of a bill may work behind the
scenes to select an appropriate plaintiff.181
Functionally, these statutes thus spur state citizens to violate federal law (thereby
generating a constitutional lawsuit) by implicitly or explicitly vouching the support of
the state in the ensuing litigation.182 They further attempt to frame the conceptual scope
of such litigation by codifying the constitutional basis for the state’s objections. A
provision of the Idaho anti-ACA statute, for instance, espouses an enumerated powers
argument against federal healthcare reform.183 Provisions of this variety provide a
strategic plan of attack to guide plaintiffs once litigation commences.184
Sovereignty statutes can also influence the jurisdictional analysis of federal courts
in two ways.185 First, by implicitly sanctioning illegal activity—such as the
manufacturing of firearms in violation of federal regulations—opposition laws

178. Id. at 1474.
179. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-9003(2) (2011).
180. Id. at § 39-9004 (2).
181. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
182. See Montana Fires a Warning Shot over States’ Rights, NBCNEWS.COM (Apr. 29, 2009,
4:54 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30482736/ns/us_news-life/t/montana-fires-warning
-shot-over-states-rights/#.UPmcm2faK-0 (discussing the Montana Firearms Freedom Act and
noting that the “drafters of the law hope to set off a legal battle”).
183. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-9003 (2011).
184. Cf. Dinan, supra note 12, at 1656 (describing litigation under the Montana Firearms
Freedom Act).
185. The analysis here focuses on the ramifications of opposition statutes for Article III
standing, and thus its conclusions are limited to federal courts. The jurisdictional analysis for
state courts in this context will vary by state.
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arguably contribute to the existence of a justiciable controversy. This was the
approach endorsed by proponents of the Montana Firearms Freedom Act, which
purports to exempt from federal regulation those firearms that are produced in
Montana and remain in-state.186 Drafters of the bill publicly admitted that they
intended to locate an ideal plaintiff to threaten to manufacture firearms in compliance
with state law (and therefore in violation of federal law) in order to generate a
controversy ripe for judicial resolution.187
In accordance with this strategy, following passage of the statute, a Montana gun
manufacturer filed suit in federal court, seeking an injunction against the
enforcement of contrary federal regulations.188 Consistent with its implicit promise
of support, Montana intervened in the suit to defend its statute.189 Plaintiff’s standing
arguments centered on the existence of the state enactment: he contended that
hundreds of potential customers were only willing to purchase his firearms if they
were manufactured pursuant to the Montana bill.190 Federal law prevented him from
taking advantage of this market, thus allegedly creating a ripe controversy.191 The
district court dismissed the claim on jurisdictional grounds.192 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed on the standing issue—finding that plaintiff had demonstrated the
existence of economic injury—but dismissed on the merits.193 As this episode
illustrates, the effectiveness of opposition statutes in helping to generate jurisdiction
will typically be highly fact-dependent.
The second avenue by which these statutes may trigger federal jurisdiction is
through the fabrication of injury-in-fact for state standing purposes. Virginia’s
opposition to federal healthcare reform exemplifies this strategy. The Virginia
Healthcare Freedom Act, which purported to nullify the ACA,194 was specifically
intended to render justiciable Virginia’s challenge to the constitutionality of the
ACA’s individual mandate provision.195 Since the individual mandate imposes no
duties on the states themselves, Virginia was forced to rely on the conflict between
federal law and its nullification statute to establish standing.196 According to the state,
the “collision between the state and federal schemes . . . creates an immediate, actual
controversy involving antagonistic assertions of right.”197

186. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-20-104 (2009).
187. Montana Fires a Warning Shot over States’ Rights, supra note 182 (noting that
proponents of the law “plan to find a ‘squeaky clean’ Montanan who wants to send a note to
the ATF threatening to build and sell about 20 . . . rifles without federal dealership licensing”).
188. Dinan, supra note 12, at 1657.
189. Id. at 1658.
190. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-DWM-JCL, slip op. at 5 (D.
Mont. Aug. 31, 2010) (Findings and Recommendation of U.S. Mag. J.).
191. Id. at 5–6.
192. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV 09–147–M–DWM–JCL, slip op. at
8 (D. Mont. Oct. 18, 2010).
193. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2013).
194. See supra notes 135–136 and accompanying text.
195. Dinan, supra note 12, at 1663.
196. Virginia v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 267 (4th Cir. 2011).
197. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 3:10CV188–HEH).
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States are permitted to litigate as parens patriae to protect the collective interests
of their citizens, but Massachusetts v. Mellon bars states proceeding under this
doctrine from challenging federal law.198 The Mellon bar does not apply, however,
to suits where a state seeks merely to protect its own sovereign interests against
federal intrusion.199 Sovereign interests include, among other things, “the power to
create and enforce a legal code.”200 Thus, the crucial question in the Virginia
litigation was whether the state sought to vindicate a sovereign interest or instead to
litigate as parens patriae. The suit could proceed only in the former circumstance.201
Virginia contended that federal preemption of its nullification statute infringed its
power to establish and administer a legal code.202 The Fourth Circuit, however, focused
on the conjunctive language of the relevant formulation: “only when a federal law
interferes with a state’s exercise of its sovereign power ‘to create and enforce a legal
code’ does it inflict on the state the requisite injury-in-fact.”203 Since the Virginia
Healthcare Freedom Act was not enforceable in any meaningful sense—“Virginia lacks
the sovereign authority to nullify federal law”204—federal preemption of that statute did
not interfere with the exercise of Virginia’s sovereign prerogatives.205
The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that Virginia’s actual purpose in pursuing a
constitutional challenge was to protect its residents from the effects of the ACA.206
The suit therefore constituted an improper parens patriae proceeding and was
consequently dismissed for lack of standing.207 In the panel’s view, a state cannot
simply manufacture a federal constitutional case by passing a statute in opposition to
federal law.208 State standing is a notoriously complex field, however, and the case
law on this issue is mixed.209 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis represents a
plausible interpretation of existing precedent.210

198. 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923) (“It cannot be conceded that a State, as parens patriae,
may institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the operation
of the statutes thereof . . . it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of
their relations with the federal government.”).
199. See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV.
387, 492 (1995); Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 VA.
L. REV. 2051, 2053, 2072–73 (2011).
200. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
201. Virginia, 656 F.3d at 269.
202. Id. at 268. This proposition finds some support in the case law. See Wyoming v.
United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[f]ederal regulatory action
that preempts state law creates a sufficient injury-in-fact” to the state’s sovereign interest in
creating and enforcing a legal code).
203. Virginia, 656 F.3d at 269 (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601) (emphasis in original).
204. Id. at 270.
205. Id. at 269–70. This reasoning is, of course, subject to debate. For an argument that the
court reached the wrong result altogether, see Crocker, supra note 199, at 2096–97. For an
argument that the court reached the right result for the wrong reasons, see Stephen I. Vladeck,
States’ Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 870 (2012).
206. Virginia, 656 F.3d at 271.
207. Id. at 272–73.
208. Id. at 271–72; see also Vladeck, supra note 205, at 870.
209. See supra note 202.
210. See supra note 205.
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Lastly, state opposition may influence adjudication by shaping the content of
substantive doctrine. A growing body of scholarship acknowledges that Supreme
Court decisions frequently reflect popular consensus.211 Specifically, public opinion
often plays an important role “in guiding judicial interpretation of the open-textured
language” of the Constitution.212 This effect is unsurprising: judges “are influenced
by changes in constitutional culture” for the simple reason that “they live in this
culture . . . and absorb its assumptions and presuppositions.”213 The Court’s
awareness of its own fragile institutional position may also prompt sensitivity to
public opinion.214 For these reasons, among others, a social movement that promotes
certain constitutional understandings in the political realm may induce the Court to
memorialize its viewpoint in formal opinions.215
The impact of political movements on constitutional adjudication is evidenced by
a number of significant historical episodes.216 Supporters of the Equal Rights
Amendment, for instance, ultimately failed in their quest to formally amend the
Constitution but arguably succeeded as a functional matter when the primary tenets
of their platform were incorporated into the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence.217 Similarly, the contours of the Second Amendment right recognized
in District of Columbia v. Heller218 potentially reflect a constitutional consensus
reached outside the courts in the late twentieth century.219
The specific effect of opposition statutes on judicial reasoning may take one of
two forms. First, such statutes can confer prominence on a formerly obscure
interpretation of a constitutional provision. Successful public mobilization in favor of
a self-defense-oriented reading of the Second Amendment represents a conspicuous
example of this phenomenon.220 Second, they can provide an important framing device
for constitutional objections to a newly announced federal policy. Nullification
resolutions targeting the ACA, for instance, were premised on the argument that the
bill was not justified as a legitimate exercise of Congress’ enumerated powers.221 States
could have taken an alternative route, however, by contending that the ACA infringed

211. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 4 (2009); see also Michael J.
Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 6–7
(1996) (arguing that many major constitutional transformations were “congruent with and
dependent upon the broad sweep of historical forces”).
212. Siegel, supra note 12, at 1338.
213. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 91 (2011).
214. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 211, at 14 (“The justices recognize the fragility of their
position . . . and for the most part . . . their decisions hew rather closely to the mainstream of
popular judgment about the meaning of the Constitution.”).
215. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 1323.
216. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and
Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483, 495–96 (2012).
217. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 1338–39, 1368.
218. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
219. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 194 (2008).
220. See id.
221. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 156, at 783 (noting that states tend to frame objections
to the ACA in terms of the values of federalism); supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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certain due process rights in liberty of contract or the doctor-patient relationship.222 By
choosing to criticize the legislation on federalism grounds, states played an important
role in shaping the ensuing debate.223
The impact of these laws on constitutional doctrine is not limited to the context
of formal adjudication. They can also contribute to the formation of enforceable
constitutional understandings outside the courts.224 Keith Whittington has famously
referred to this process—that is, the crystallization of extrajudicial constitutional
norms—as “constitutional construction.”225 In Whittington’s view, these norms may
give flesh to areas of textual indeterminacy226 or even reorder the fundamental
ground rules of a constitutional system.227 Constitutional constructions, although
typically not ratified by formal judicial opinions, nevertheless achieve a degree of
permanence that binds future politicians.228 “Even while operating from the inside of
politics, . . . constructions perform the role that constitutions are supposed to
perform—they structure and constrain future political debate and government
action.”229 Because these norms are nonjudicial, political and social mobilizations
are integral in determining their content.230
Opposition statutes have the capacity to play an important role in the formation
of new constitutional constructions. The majority of these bills are fairly recent, and
thus their impact in this sphere is not yet fully discernible. Their observed effect on
public opinion, however, indicates their potential significance. State laws legalizing
medical marijuana, for example, may eventually contribute to a constitutional
settlement that places the use of medical marijuana beyond federal regulation as a
matter of the Tenth Amendment, or beyond all regulation as a matter of substantive
due process.231 Whether this outcome will occur is, of course, speculative—the

222. See Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265, 266 (2012)
(noting that “based on Supreme Court precedent at the time of the ACA’s passage, the Article
I argument bordered on frivolous whereas the due process argument had, and still has, no
‘all-fours’ doctrinal obstacles”).
223. See also supra notes 183–184 and accompanying text.
224. See Zietlow, supra note 216, at 495–97.
225. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 1 (“Constitutional construction is the method of
elaborating constitutional meaning in this political realm.”); see also BALKIN, supra note 213,
at 297–312. Different authors articulate the distinction between interpretation and construction
in different ways. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 12, at 66; Lawrence B. Solum, The
Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 95–96 (2010).
226. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 1.
227. See id.; see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 196 (1991)
(discussing Reconstruction and the New Deal).
228. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 218.
229. Id. at 219.
230. BALKIN, supra note 213, at 83–84.
231. The fact that the former argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Gonzalez v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005), does not mean it is necessarily precluded from forming the basis
of a constitutional construction. Political actors engaged in constitutional interpretation
frequently “depart from judicial efforts to define constitutional meaning.” WHITTINGTON,
supra note 12, at 2. Indeed, the very existence of constitutional constructions is a testament to
the “continuing effort to resist the judicial monopolization of the Constitution and its
meaning.” Id. at 207.
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process of construction on this issue is not yet complete. It is unclear what the
contours of any eventual construction will be, or even whether a construction will be
reached. Nevertheless, state legislation has indisputably molded the constitutional
debate on this issue in important ways thus far.232
C. Affecting Federal Policy
Finally, opposition laws are capable of exerting a direct influence on both the
federal government’s enforcement priorities and its substantive policies. The statutes
with the most significant real-world impact in this respect fall into two categories:
those that exempt conduct from state penalties and those that prohibit state officers
from assisting in the enforcement of federal law.233 The former may convince the
federal government to allocate enforcement resources elsewhere in order to address
conduct criminalized under both state and federal regimes, while the latter may
induce the federal government to alter its substantive policies in order to coax states
into offering enforcement assistance.
The War on Drugs represents the most prominent setting in which state laws have
significantly influenced federal enforcement priorities. The federal government lacks
the resources to comprehensively enforce its marijuana ban: “[o]nly 1 percent of the
roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal
authorities.”234 As a result, the federal government must carefully choose where to
allocate its enforcement capital. Widespread state legalization235 of medical236
marijuana has apparently convinced the Department of Justice (DOJ) to moderate its
prosecution of individuals who use the drug in compliance with state regulations.237
Attorney General Eric Holder announced in 2009 that “it will not be a priority to use
federal resources to prosecute patients with serious illnesses or their caregivers who are
complying with state laws on medical marijuana.”238

232. California’s regulatory scheme, for instance, received extensive attention in Raich,
despite the fact that the issue presented involved the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority, which is doctrinally unrelated to state law. 545 U.S. at 5–6.
233. Direct nullification bills, in contrast, have had minimal effect on federal lawmakers thus
far. See Emily Bazelon, Nullification Everywhere, SLATE (Sept. 4, 2013, 5:49 AM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/09/colorada_and_washington
_marijuana_legalization_why_aren_t_liberals_as_excited.html.
234. Mikos, supra note 86, at 1424.
235. Jost, supra note 136, at 871 (noting that, as of 2010, over a quarter of all U.S. states
had legalized medical marijuana).
236. As before, this subpart focuses primarily on medical rather than recreational
marijuana statutes for the simple reason that they are more prevalent. See supra note 82.
237. The DOJ has adopted a similarly hands-off approach to state legalization of
recreational marijuana. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department
Announces Update to Marijuana Enforcement Policy (Aug. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/August/13-opa-974.html; see also Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan
Grim, Eric Holder Says DOJ Will Let Washington, Colorado Marijuana Laws Go into Effect,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/29
/eric-holder-marijuana-washington-colorado-doj_n_3837034.html.
238. Dinan, supra note 12, at 1650 (emphasis added).
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A contemporaneous memorandum issued to United States Attorneys reaffirms
this policy,239 but is careful to note that “clear and unambiguous compliance with
state law” does not “create a legal defense to a violation of the Controlled Substances
Act.”240 The policy contained in the memorandum is therefore “intended solely as a
guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion.”241 Thus, although
state medical marijuana statutes are incapable of neutralizing federal penalties, they
have achieved limited success by prompting (at least for now) a reallocation of
federal enforcement resources.242 The current policy may even survive the transition
to a new administration insofar as it creates reliance interests and special interest
groups that serve as impediments to change.
Opposition statutes are also capable of influencing the federal government’s
substantive agenda. Enactments that prohibit state officers from assisting in the
enforcement of federal law are especially likely to have this effect for two reasons.
First, state opposition can sensitize federal officials to constitutional concerns they
had not previously been inclined to address. This phenomenon may already have
materialized in the War on Terror, where local opposition to Patriot Act enforcement
has repeatedly forced federal officials to publicly confront civil liberties issues that
they would have preferred to ignore.243
Second, the federal government may be inclined to modify its position in order to
induce state enforcement assistance. The War on Terror again serves as a
paradigmatic example. Federal authorities lack the manpower to ensure national
security on their own.244 And, under the anticommandeering rule, the federal
government cannot mandate that state officers provide aid.245 It therefore has a
powerful incentive to moderate its substantive position in order to persuade reluctant
or dissenting states to cooperate.246 In short, federal dependence on state assistance
may compel national lawmakers to grant concessions to state concerns in order to
achieve federal policy objectives.247 Although the secrecy surrounding Patriot Act
implementation makes a comprehensive evaluation difficult, certain indicators
suggest that an effect of this nature may already have occurred.248

239. David W. Ogden, Memorandum for Selected United States Attorneys on
Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana, JUST.
BLOG (Oct. 19, 2009), http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/192.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Taylor, supra note 26, at 32 (noting that in the context of medical marijuana, “[d]e
facto nullification has won a partial victory.”).
243. Althouse, supra note 12, at 1271–73 & n.139 (describing the reactions of federal
officials to civil liberties concerns attending the Patriot Act).
244. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 12, at 1280; Young, supra note 155, at 1280–81.
245. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. The federal government may offer
monetary incentives to states to obtain their assistance, but even these grants may not be
coercive. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
246. See Young, supra note 155, at 1290.
247. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 12, at 1266–67.
248. Althouse, supra note 12, at 1272–73; cf. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 12, at
1280 n.85 (noting that federal “secrecy makes it difficult to know how, if at all, state resistance
has thwarted or modified the Act’s implementation[,]” but that “[a]t a minimum, . . . state
resolutions helped shape the national conversation”).
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IV. TRANSSUBSTANTIVE CHARACTERISTICS
As the prior Part illustrates, contemporary opposition statutes are designed to
serve a multitude of legal and political purposes. The obvious unifying characteristic
of these laws is resistance to federal policy. Several other properties, however, also
tend to permeate the field. First, opposition statutes frequently use language that
characterizes the offensive federal legislation not merely as unwise but as
unconstitutional. Enactments that explicitly adopt a constitutional stance are
important instruments in the process of constitutional politics. Second, sovereignty
laws tend to be characterized by a remarkably variable political orientation. Members
of both the traditional left and right repeatedly invoke principles of state autonomy
to justify deviation from the national norm. This feature lends credence to theories
of opportunistic federalism. Third, opposition statutes are universally territorial:
insofar as they purport to invalidate or impede federal policy, they do so only within
the physical borders of the complaining state. This Part explores each of these
unifying traits in turn.
A. Constitutional Language
Constitutional claims form the centerpiece of a wide array of state sovereignty
laws. Expressive statutes, obviously, are riddled with constitutional language, as
exemplified by the widespread enactment of Tenth Amendment resolutions.249 Laws
that exempt federally prohibited conduct from state penalties incorporate
constitutional arguments less frequently, but enumerated powers objections are
beginning to emerge in the medical marijuana context.250 Prohibitions on state
participation in federal enforcement efforts occasionally incorporate constitutional
standards by barring assistance only when it would entail unconstitutional conduct
on the part of state officers.251 Finally, statutes that declare federal law invalid,252 as
well as those that provide for the arrest of federal officers,253 almost universally
predicate their claims on independent interpretations of the Constitution. The only
initiatives that do not employ constitutional arguments are those intended to
supplement federal law enforcement.254

249. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
250. WOODS, supra note 12, at 11.
251. See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 130–137 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 144–145 and accompanying text.
254. See supra Part II.D. The fact that these efforts do not consciously employ constitutional
rhetoric does not suggest that no constitutional arguments are available in this context. States
dissatisfied with feeble federal enforcement efforts could argue, for instance, that the Take Care
Clause requires the President to enforce federal laws. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President]
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo,
Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act,
and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784–85 (2013) (arguing that “the deliberate
decision to leave a substantial area of statutory law unenforced or underenforced is a serious breach
of presidential duty” under the Take Care Clause).
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Grounding state opposition in the Constitution serves two distinct purposes. First,
it helps impart an aura of legitimacy to a historically suspect enterprise. Nullification
and other forms of state resistance are commonly associated with such besmirched
causes as Southern independence and racial segregation.255 Furthermore, as a purely
conceptual matter, nullification can easily be characterized as an act of usurpation—
from a constitutional perspective, it is perfectly clear that states do not possess the
authority to unilaterally override federal law.256
Phrasing state objections in constitutional terms simultaneously solves both of
these problems. First, the use of constitutional language helps to cleanse the states’
rights project of its checkered history by aligning modern foes of particular federal
policies with the “true” meaning of the Constitution.257 This strategy permits
proponents of state autonomy to portray themselves as working within the confines
of a national system to defend the Constitution against federal distortion and
misappropriation.258 In this light, modern-day nullifiers are not traitorous
malcontents, but rather vigorous dissenters striving to preserve and perpetuate
fundamental American principles.
Second, constitutional rhetoric helps to rebut the critique that state opposition—
in particular, state nullification—represents an act of usurpation. The Supremacy
Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . ,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”259 On its face, this language appears to render nullification statutes
categorically illegitimate. In order for a federal law to trigger the Supremacy Clause,
however, it must conform to constitutional rules.260 A federal statute that offends the
Constitution is not law at all, for purposes of the Supremacy Clause or otherwise.261
Nullification statutes play off this analysis by asserting that the targeted federal

255. See, e.g., Wilentz, supra note 26.
256. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
257. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 213 (“Whether defending an existing
construction or advocating its replacement with a new one, those engaging in constructions
sought to identify themselves with the true and required meaning of the Constitution.”);
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 12, at 1279 (“The states position themselves as rightful
interpreters of the U.S. Constitution, and they express their purposes as members of the
national community, not isolated sovereigns.”).
258. See Althouse, supra note 12, at 1233 (noting that many state sovereignty laws
“acknowledge federal supremacy in the form of the Constitution, but express independence in
articulating the content and extent of constitutional rights”).
259. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
260. The Supremacy Clause’s mandate that federal law be made “in pursuance of” the
Constitution arguably makes explicit the principle that only law enacted in conformity with
substantive constitutional rules can qualify as supreme. Compare Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 924–25 (1997) (suggesting that a law is not made “in pursuance of” the Constitution
unless it complies with substantive constitutional rules), with Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis
and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011) (“This ‘in Pursuance’ caveat is most
plausibly read to confer supremacy on all statutes that survive the bicameralism-and-presentment
hurdles established in Article I, Section 7.”).
261. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“[A]n act of the legislature,
repugnant to the constitution, is void.”).
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legislation is unconstitutional. If their reasoning is meritorious, the Supremacy
Clause will be inapplicable. Constitutional claims thus enable nullification bills to
sidestep outright defiance of higher law.
Apart from legitimizing a potentially subversive enterprise, the use of
constitutional language also empowers states to play a role in the development of
constitutional doctrine. As discussed in the previous Part, sovereignty laws may
affect the trajectory and content of both judicial precedent and constitutional
construction.262 State legislatures that enact statutes designed to resist federal policy
are thus engaged in a form of popular constitutionalism, or “constitutional advocacy
outside of the courts.”263
The fact that these constitutional claims are employed in the service of political
agendas does not automatically render them disingenuous or invalid.264 The use of
constitutional rhetoric by social movements places their claims on a different plane
than those phrased in the vocabulary of ordinary partisan disagreement; the former may
result in binding constitutional constructions, while the latter will not. Political crusades
that explicitly frame their arguments in constitutional terms thus cannot be disregarded
simply on the grounds that their constitutional objectives shade into their political ones.
In fact, popular constitutionalists actually “reinscribe the authority of the
law/politics distinction.”265 Constitutional argumentation in the political realm
reflects a self-conscious decision by a social movement to engage in a qualitatively
distinct mode of discourse.266 State legislators who ground their arguments in
constitutional law rather than mere politics necessarily embrace and reaffirm the
distinction between the two. The invocation of constitutional principles is not merely
a politically expedient rhetorical strategy; instead, it is a mechanism for bringing the
nation’s ultimate law to bear on the deepest issues of national identity. By drawing
on unifying, overarching principles to advance political agendas, opposition statutes
reinforce constitutional supremacy and relevance.267
B. Political Diversity
The second transsubstantive characteristic of opposition statutes is their variable
political valence. State efforts to undermine federal policy originate with legislators
and activists across the political spectrum.268 Nullification is traditionally associated
with conservative ideology, and many stereotypically right-wing causes are
represented among the multitude of modern opposition measures. Efforts to impede

262. See supra notes 211–232 and accompanying text.
263. Zietlow, supra note 216, at 484.
264. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 107 (“The Constitution is not simply used as political
cover, nor are constitutional arguments employed in a purely cynical manner as yet another
tactical weapon available to disputants. Rather, . . . the constitutional text is provided meaning
by the success of political movements in relating the document to current political life.”).
265. Siegel, supra note 12, at 1345.
266. See BALKIN, supra note 213, at 86.
267. See id.
268. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights is Rallying Cry of Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2010, at A1 (noting the politically diverse policy agendas pursued by modern
proponents of state autonomy).
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federal gun control or thwart national healthcare reform serve as prototypical
examples. A significant number of these statutes, however—including medical
marijuana laws and bills enacted in opposition to foreign interventionism269—are
more closely associated with liberal ideology. Less mainstream political philosophies,
such as libertarianism270 and localism,271 also find expression in at least a handful of
antifederal enactments. Many resistance efforts are even bipartisan.272 This variability
has a lengthy pedigree; historical instances of state opposition similarly embody a
pattern of unstable political affiliation.273
These examples should be sufficient to refute any superficial perception that state
resistance efforts are driven exclusively by conservative interests. The political
diversity of the contemporary sovereignty movement lends credence to theories of
opportunistic federalism, which posit that arguments about the structural allocation
of authority between states and the federal government “are mere proxies for
substantive objections to particular laws and policies.”274 These theories necessarily
rely on the observation that federalism “is an empty normative shell”275 that can be
invoked to support an infinite variety of political agendas. The primary hypothesis
of such theories is that commitments to federal values are typically based on transient
convenience rather than principle.276 Historical patterns and contemporary politics
tend to confirm this conjecture.277
Opportunistic federalism may be undesirable for a number of reasons. First, the
value of appeals to state autonomy is degraded by excessive opportunism. Advocates
of states’ rights on particular issues may be ineffective if the public perceives that their
“commitment” to local diversity is merely a convenient rhetorical device for promoting

269. For examples of opposition statutes relating to foreign interventionism, see Vikram
David Amar, Converse § 1983 Suits in Which States Police Federal Agents, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 1369, 1369–70 (2004).
270. Virtually all state efforts to erode federal regulatory authority can plausibly be
classified as libertarian in at least some respects.
271. See, e.g., David Gumpert, Here’s a Way To Eliminate the Regulators and Lawyers, and
Build Community at the Same Time: Organize and Declare “Food Sovereignty,” Like Sedgwick,
Maine, COMPLETE PATIENT (Mar. 7, 2011, 5:40 PM), http://thecompletepatient.com/article
/2011/march/7/heres-way-eliminate-regulators-and-lawyers-and-build-community-same-time
(discussing a food sovereignty resolution which declares that local “citizens possess the right to
produce, process, sell, purchase, and consume local foods of their choosing,” and that “[i]t shall
be unlawful for any law or regulation adopted by the state or federal government to interfere with
the rights recognized by this Ordinance”).
272. See Taylor, supra note 26.
273. E.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance
in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 598 (2007) (“Among the more
famous examples of . . . federalism opportunism is the role reversal between pro-slavery and
abolitionist interests before and after the Civil War.”).
274. Leonard, supra note 12, at 126; see also Cross, supra note 12, at 1307 (“[F]ederalism
is consistently (and I contend inherently) employed only derivatively, as a tool to achieve some
other ideological end, rather than as a principled end in and of itself.”).
275. Hays, supra note 40, at 202.
276. See Cross, supra note 12, at 1307.
277. See Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 131, 134–
36 (2004).
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an unrelated substantive position.278 Second, as noted above, the prevalence of
opportunism in this context reflects the absence of a principled commitment to
federalism as a stand-alone constitutional feature.279 If federal limits are only applied
when convenient, they may be underenforced. Principles invoked exclusively to
achieve certain ends will be ignored when they are not useful to achieve those ends—
even if, as a neutral matter of text or structure, their application is warranted.
Finally, pervasive opportunism may deter even those who hold a principled
commitment to federalism from adhering to their beliefs. As Ilya Somin and John
McGinnis argue:
In the absence of a credible commitment to federalism, it is irrational . . .
even for those who would prefer a consistent respect for federalism to
their particular first order substantive policies to act on such preferences.
They have no assurance that their political opponents will similarly
respect federalism. If they hold back on pursuing their preferred policies
for the sake of federalism, they take a risk that their forbearance will
result in neither a coherent federalism nor their preferred substantive
policies.280
Despite its drawbacks, this type of opportunism is nevertheless capable of
indirectly serving structural interests. In the absence of a principled federalism, the
utility of states’ rights as a convenient, temporary political tool may actually be
necessary to ensure the long-term preservation of state autonomy.281 State
legislatures and executives arguably represent a sufficiently diverse collection of
political views that, regardless of the particular national policy at stake, at least some
state actors will resist it on federalism grounds.282 Ongoing friction between state and
federal governments—whether it stems from a principled or opportunistic appeal to
federal values—assists in policing the federal balance of power.283 The repeated
invocation of state autonomy by a host of different agents thus represents an
important mechanism for preserving federalism as a structural principle.284
C. Territorialism
The third unifying characteristic of state opposition efforts is their territorialism.
This particular feature accompanies sovereignty laws of every stripe. Statutes that
remove state penalties for federally prohibited conduct, for instance, affect only

278. See Young, supra note 155, at 1310.
279. Several commentators have argued that opportunistic appeals to federalism are far
more prevalent than principled appeals. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 277, at 134 (“[T]he
willingness of lawmakers and interest groups to manipulate federalism in order to secure
preferred substantive policies is the rule.”).
280. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 12, at 99–100.
281. Young, supra note 155, at 1308–09.
282. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 163, at 1090 (“In a nation with fifty states, a sizeable
number are always governed by the party out of power at the national level.”).
283. See Devins, supra note 277, at 134.
284. See Young, supra note 155, at 1309.
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in-state behavior.285 Measures that bar state officials from implementing federal
law,286 as well as those that supplement federal enforcement efforts,287 also tend to
exclusively affect the operations of the enacting state. Similarly, statutes that purport
to invalidate federal law or hinder its enforcement universally declare that their
effects are confined to state residents and purely intrastate conduct.288 Expressive
statutes represent the only category of Part II’s taxonomy that arguably lacks this
characteristic. Nevertheless, even resolutions of this ilk frequently include language
indicating that the expressed views are those of the state and its residents alone.289
The territorial quality of these enactments obviously does not imply a similar
limitation on their consequences—as noted, many opposition statutes are expressly
designed to influence national policy.290 Nevertheless, sovereignty laws are universally
territorial in their direct effects. Nullification, in both its historical and modern
incarnations, is an intrinsically defensive mechanism, designed to interpose the state
between its citizens and an allegedly tyrannical federal government. This dynamic
illustrates James Madison’s famous observation that federalism creates a “double
security” for individual rights by empowering and motivating competing sovereigns to
thwart the development of excessive concentrations of power.291 Opposition statutes
represent an important tool in state efforts to ensure that regional interests are not
overrun by an “irresistible gravitation of all power” to the central government.292
Territorialism represents a necessary consequence of certain practical realities. In
depriving the federal government of law enforcement assistance, for example, a state
can only withhold its own resources; it cannot mandate that other states do the same.
Similarly, the removal of state penalties for federally prohibited conduct will, by
practical necessity, be confined in scope to the jurisdiction of the legalizing state.
Although individual states may call on their sisters to join in an opposition effort,293
they lack the authority to command them to do so. Constitutional text also plays a
role in producing the territorial quality of many sovereignty laws. Statutes that
purport to insulate purely intrastate activity from federal regulation on the grounds
that such conduct falls outside the purview of the Commerce Clause,294 for instance,
are necessarily territorial.295 These enactments explicitly refer to state borders as an
essential element of their constitutional theories.

285. See supra Part II.B.
286. See supra Part II.C.
287. See supra Part II.D.
288. See supra Part II.E–F.
289. See supra Part II.A.
290. See supra Part III.B–C.
291. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
292. Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1229, 1237 (1994).
293. See, e.g., Letter from Susan Lynn, Tenn. State Representative, to the Other Forty-Nine
State Legislatures (Oct. 20, 2009), available at http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2009/10/20
/they-cant-push-us-around-forever/ (reprinting a letter calling for “a joint working group
between the states to enumerate the abuses of authority by the federal government”).
294. The Supreme Court, of course, does not place definitive weight on state borders in
conducting Commerce Clause analysis. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
295. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-404(a) (2013).
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Territorialism is not only inevitable in many respects, however, but can also be
beneficial. For instance, it both encourages regional variation and decentralizes
power. “So long as preferences for government policies are unevenly distributed
among the various localities, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decision
making than by a single national authority.”296 This principle holds true not only in
contexts where states originate first-order policies but also in those situations where
they attempt to counteract the effects of certain federal statutes. Voters’ appetite for
resistance to federal law, like their appetite for any policy, varies geographically. The
territorial character of opposition statutes confines their expressive and functional
impact to those populations willing to bear the negative consequences associated
with active dissent.297
V. ASSESSING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
The analysis to this point has been purely descriptive. State resistance efforts,
however, also raise complex normative questions regarding the permissible scope
and character of state action in a federal system. This Part tentatively concludes that
opposition laws are desirable insofar as they safely promote the benefits of
decentralization within the constraints imposed by a national union. The chief
purpose of the following analysis, however, is primarily to establish a framework for
assessing the relevant issues—not to furnish definitive conclusions. Many of the
normative questions raised by state opposition laws are not amenable to clean
conceptual or empirical resolution, but identifying these statutes’ principal benefits
and costs represents an important first step in constructing the analytical framework
necessary for further study.298 The following skeletal analysis thus attempts to lay
the groundwork for future debate.299
Viewed charitably, opposition statutes produce a multitude of benefits. First, they
provide a check on erroneous federal constitutional interpretations. Second, as a tool
of constitutional politics, they deepen political discourse and strengthen the
Constitution’s democratic legitimacy. Third, they further the traditional federalism
values of regional diversity and satisfaction of local preferences. Like any complex
social phenomenon, however, the sovereignty movement is also characterized by a
number of potential downsides. Nullification efforts have historically posed serious

296. McConnell, supra note 12, at 1493.
297. For a more complete discussion of the extent to which state opposition laws further
the values of federalism, see infra notes 324–326 and accompanying text.
298. In a sense, the arguments for and against state sovereignty laws presented in this Part are
analogous to the arguments for and against the use of legislative history by judges. Although
riddled with intractable empirical disputes, such arguments provide useful ways of thinking about
the pertinent issues. See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 350–62 (2011).
299. This Part focuses on opposition statutes exclusively from the perspective of
constitutional structure. It does not address their purely local costs or benefits. For example,
some detractors of direct nullification claim that it is fruitless and wastes state resources. E.g.,
Editorial, Nullification Bills Are Waste of Public’s Time, OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 21, 2013,
http://newsok.com/nullification-bills-are-waste-of-publics-time/article/3767824/?page=1.
These criticisms raise questions of political expedience that can only be resolved on the basis
of local preference. They thus fall beyond the purview of this Article.
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threats to national unity and served as major obstacles to the implementation of
federal policy. Furthermore, even moderate forms of interpretive pluralism may be
conducive to anarchy or detrimental to the rule of law. This Part explores each of
these potential ramifications in turn.
One of the principal upsides of state opposition is its capacity to limit the impact
of spurious constitutional interpretations championed by the federal government.
State officers who predicate their dissent on the Constitution necessarily assert at
least a limited degree of interpretive autonomy.300 As a result, opposition statutes
frequently constitute a form of vertical departmentalism, representing the efforts of
state actors to interpret the Constitution without regard to the interpretations favored
by federal entities.301 Modern assertions of state interpretive autonomy typically
occur in the interstices of national supremacy, that is, in situations where state action
is shielded by the anticommandeering rule or in contexts where the state is not subject
to a direct court order resolving the precise question at issue.302
The major drawback of a federal monopoly on constitutional meaning is that it
insulates interpretive errors from correction.303 Vertical departmentalism ameliorates
this failing. Although contemporary opposition leaders respect the authority of
judicial decrees in litigated cases to which the state is a party,304 they decline to accept
judicial dictates as legislating universal rules of conduct.305 This approach curbs the
reach of federal constitutional interpretations and, by amplifying dissent, encourages
the federal government to fully consider alternative arguments before definitively
imposing its preferred vision.
In addition to blunting the impact of erroneous federal interpretations, state
resistance may affirmatively promote the pursuit of truth: “[i]t is more likely that the
law will be interpreted faithfully when that interpretation is the product of the
interaction of competing views, fighting for either supremacy or consensus,”306 than
when a single decision maker enjoys autocratic discretion. Interpretive pluralism
affords a voice to a wider slice of the political spectrum than does a model of judicial

300. Cf. Young, supra note 155, at 1288–89 (arguing that state dissent sometimes
represents a “state-based version of departmentalism”).
301. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 12, at 329–30; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James
T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the
Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 688 (1995).
302. Even modest versions of vertical departmentalism, however, arguably strain the limits
of existing Supreme Court precedent. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1958); cf.
Paulsen, supra note 12, at 225.
303. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 691, 710 (2004) (“[T]he possibility of erroneous constitutional interpretations . . .
exists without the possibility of a check or corrective if interpretive supremacy is vested in a
particular body.”).
304. See infra notes 336–337 and accompanying text.
305. For instance, the intrastate sale of firearms almost certainly falls within the ambit of
Congress’ commerce powers under existing precedent. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005). Utah’s Firearms Freedom Act, however, implicitly asserts that the state is justified in
declining to accept the implications of this precedent in the absence of a binding judicial
decision on the precise point in issue in a case to which the state is a party. See supra notes
130–134 and accompanying text.
306. Paulsen, supra note 12, at 330.
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exclusivity, which may be prone to favoring establishment viewpoints. In short,
vertical departmentalism breaks the federal monopoly on interpretation and subjects
constitutional meaning to the marketplace of ideas.307
Furthermore, a diffuse approach to constitutional interpretation is arguably more
congruous with the broader constitutional scheme of decentralization than is a system
of pure federal interpretive supremacy.308 Various constitutional mechanisms operate
to create “gridlock” in the process of policy formulation. Interpretive gridlock
advances many of the same purposes—such as compelling deliberation and
preventing dangerous concentrations of power—that policy gridlock does.309
These benefits, however, are accompanied by a symmetrical cost: just as
interpretive pluralism may obstruct the implementation of incorrect federal
decisions, so too may it obstruct the implementation of correct ones.310 This
particular hazard is minimized by the fact that modern nullifiers accept judicial
supremacy in cases to which they are parties.311 A nullifying state can thus be induced
to retract its position if conclusive litigation demonstrates that its constitutional
arguments are untenable. Judicial decrees are not a panacea, however—states that
exempt federally prohibited conduct from state penalties or withhold enforcement
assistance are protected by the anticommandeering rule from interference by courts.
Nevertheless, the federal government is still free to muster its own resources to
enforce federal law in those states.
Consequently, regardless of the type of state opposition at issue, federal
authorities have the ultimate power to impose their policy vision (assuming that
vision is constitutional). Rather than fatally undermining federal supremacy, active
resistance merely ensures that sufficient accord exists to warrant imposing the federal
government’s stance on outlier states.312 Modern forms of opposition may fragment
weak consensuses predicated on specious constitutional interpretations but will not
ultimately prevent the implementation of a constitutional vision supported by a truly
national understanding.313
The second potential benefit produced by opposition statutes relates to their effect
on “constitutional consciousness.”314 Confiding exclusive interpretive authority to a
single body, such as the Supreme Court, may have the practical effect of reducing

307. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
308. See Paulsen, supra note 26, at 2738 (noting that interpretive pluralism “admits of—
indeed, virtually assures—exactly what separation of powers is designed to produce as a
general proposition” (emphasis in original)).
309. Paulsen, supra note 12, at 330 (“Interpretive gridlock is no different from substantive
gridlock.”).
310. See, e.g., McKay, supra note 29, at 991–92 (exploring Southern resistance to the
Court’s desegregation decisions).
311. See infra notes 337–339 and accompanying text.
312. Cf. Hays, supra note 40, at 206 (“[S]tate resistance creates a form of gridlock that
slows the suspect policy’s enforcement” and “provides a constitutional alternative to the one
promulgated by the national government.”).
313. See id. at 206–07 (“With states protecting against national oppression, the people
would have the time necessary to express their preference through the ballot or through the
constitutional amendment process.”) (footnote omitted).
314. SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE ABORTION AND
WAR POWERS DEBATES 22–27 (1992).
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the likelihood that other governmental actors will take their constitutional obligations
seriously.315 State legislators, for instance, are less likely to carefully consider the
constitutional implications of statutes they enact if their own views on the subject are
accorded zero weight.316 In contrast, state participation in constitutional politics
increases popular awareness of our founding principles and deepens individual
commitments to observe them.317 Vertical departmentalism decentralizes the
interpretive enterprise, thereby involving a greater number of governmental officers
in the task of constitutional articulation.318 This process expands the scope and depth
of constitutional discourse,319 transforming idle onlookers into active participants in
the constitutional project.
State involvement in this deliberative give-and-take may also serve to revitalize
the Constitution’s democratic legitimacy.320 “The ability of people to criticize the
Constitution-in-practice in the name of the Constitution and to work to push it toward
their desired vision is what helps make an ancient document newly legitimate to each
generation of Americans.”321 Vesting interpretive authority solely in the judiciary has
the potential to alienate individual citizens from the constitutional text and the values
it embodies.322 In contrast, state opposition efforts enable local populations to
participate in the Constitution’s development, thereby motivating them to become
informed and engaged on constitutional issues.323 This process produces feedback
effects; the greater quantity of discourse generated by state activism tends to educate
the public and endow constitutional disputes with a heightened degree of public
salience, thus stimulating further state involvement.324
Finally, state resistance promotes the traditional values of federalism, including
increased democratic participation, interjurisdictional competition, and the

315. Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues, Constitutional Community, 50 REV. POL. 215, 227
(1988) (“Denying judicial interpretive supremacy helps engage the interpretive
responsibilities of the other branches and the public . . . .”).
316. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, in LEGAL ESSAYS 1, 39 (1908) (arguing that legislators “have felt little
responsibility; if we are wrong, they say, the courts will correct it”).
317. See Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071, 1077
(1987).
318. See Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the
Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 386 (1997).
319. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 12, at 1309; Hays, supra note 40, at 219.
320. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 1418.
321. BALKIN, supra note 213, at 70.
322. See BURGESS, supra note 314, at 18 (“[J]udicial finality in constitutional interpretation
breeds public indifference to moral and constitutional argument.”); Neil Devins & Louis Fisher,
Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 98–104 (1998) (arguing that
judicial supremacy ultimately leads to marginalization of the Constitution).
323. Cf. BURGESS, supra note 314, at 19.
324. See Leonard, supra note 12, at 163. But see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer,
Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMM. 455, 468 (2000) (“[I]t appears to
us far from certain that a constitution is either a necessary or a sufficient condition, or even a
significant causal contributor, to fruitful public debate about matters of great political and
moral moment.”).
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heightened satisfaction of local preferences.325 By expanding the outlets available for
individuals to express themselves on national issues, opposition efforts plainly
broaden the scope of civic involvement.326 They also foment competition between
states with respect to both first-order policies (e.g., allocating enforcement resources)
and second-order policies (expressing dissatisfaction with federal law).327 Finally,
state control over the use of state enforcement resources tends to satisfy local
preferences more effectively than would a blanket national policy.
It is important to note that in all of these circumstances the potential for state
action is symmetrical; states that support federal policy may pass resolutions
expressing their views, enact laws providing assistance to federal authorities, and
generally take any action parallel to that which a dissenting state might take. A
jurisdiction’s stance with respect to federal policy thus serves as another dimension
along which it may compete to attract residents.328
The obvious rejoinder to this line of analysis lies in the observation that federalism
is intended to permit state variation only within a limited compass. In a federal union,
states have relatively free rein within a sphere of reserved powers, but cannot
legitimately diverge with respect to issues on which the national government has
constitutionally decreed that uniformity prevail.329 Two points serve to rebut this
particular objection. First, the scope of the federal government’s delegated powers is
precisely the point of contention for many dissenters.330 General appeals to national
supremacy thus beg the question rather than answer it. Second, as noted, sovereignty
laws—because they operate merely in the interstices of federal supremacy—can be
displaced by a sufficiently resolute national consensus. Contemporary resistance
efforts conspicuously refrain from challenging the federal government’s ultimate
authority to determine the extent of state power.
Opposition statutes do, however, pose at least a rhetorical threat to national unity.
Historically, state resistance repeatedly aroused divisive regional sentiments, in
addition to occasionally thwarting the exercise of federal power.331 At certain
junctures, nullification even represented a serious existential threat to federal
integrity; its most robust incarnation, in the antebellum South, arguably
foreshadowed the Civil War.332 In assessing the normative validity of modern
opposition measures, these historical episodes provide a useful point of
comparison.333 To the extent contemporary sovereignty laws pose similar risks of

325. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 12, at 164–65.
326. See id.; see also supra Part III.A.
327. See supra notes 296–297 and accompanying text.
328. See Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial
Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 468 n.34 (2002)
(collecting sources discussing interstate competition).
329. William E. Thro, That Those Limits May Not Be Forgotten: An Explanation of Dual
Sovereignty, 12 WIDENER L.J. 567, 582–83 (2003).
330. See supra notes 249–254 and accompanying text.
331. Accusations that nullification promotes anarchy and enfeebles the federal government
have as extensive a historical pedigree as nullification itself. See Claiborne, supra note 23, at 932
(describing the reaction of the Federalists to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions).
332. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
333. Cf. Dinan, supra note 12, at 1667 (“[C]ritics understandably [have sought] to de-
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disunity, their potential costs will likely outweigh their potential benefits.334
As a form of organized, state-level resistance to federal policy, modern opposition
statutes plainly bear a superficial resemblance to their predecessors. Beyond this
elemental similarity, however, they fail to conform to the historical paradigm in a
number of ways. Several features help to minimize the risks traditionally associated
with state dissent.335 First, contemporary opposition measures assume a range of
forms far more diverse than simply nullification per se.336 Declining to provide
assistance to federal enforcement efforts, for example, is qualitatively different—
both substantively and rhetorically—than outright nullification. The latter poses a far
greater risk of inciting serious discord.
Second, and most importantly, even states that purport to invalidate federal law
categorically accept judicial supremacy in litigated cases to which they are parties.
States that attempted to nullify the individual mandate provision of the ACA, for
instance, ultimately acquiesced in judicial resolution of the contested issues.337 The
policy of deferring to judicial authority was even made explicit in Virginia’s
nullification statute, which provided that “[n]o resident of this Commonwealth . . .
shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage
except as required by a court . . . .”338 Furthermore, proponents of nullification often
advise state residents to continue to comply with federal law until a conclusive
adjudication has been obtained.339
This pervasive deference to judicial supremacy suggests that contemporary
assertions of state interpretive autonomy will typically be confined to areas of legal
indeterminacy, where federal supremacy has not been conclusively imposed and a
plausible space for heterodox state interpretations exists. Those few statutes which
violate this general rule—such as laws that provide for the arrest of federal officers
engaged in the performance of their official duties340—are exceedingly rare341 and
have never been implemented in conformity with their literal text.342 Thus, the

legitimize recent state measures by associating them with the repudiated doctrine of
nullification, especially as practiced by southern states in the 1830’s and 1950’s . . . .”).
334. Cf. Wilentz, supra note 26 (arguing that “[o]nly an astonishing historical amnesia can
lend credence to” nullification).
335. See, e.g., Dinan, supra note 12, at 1639–40.
336. See supra Part II. In this Part, “nullification per se” is used to refer to statutes that
purport to directly invalidate federal law.
337. See Claiborne, supra note 23, at 952. Thus, even such direct opposition measures
arguably “partake of something short of, and other than, nullification.” Dinan, supra note 12,
at 1667.
338. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2014) (emphasis added).
339. See Dinan, supra note 12, at 1657.
340. See supra Part II.F.
341. For example, a notable Missouri effort to criminalize the enforcement of federal gun
regulations was vetoed by the governor and subsequently failed to garner the necessary votes
for an override. See Missouri Measure Nullifying Federal Gun Laws Fails in State Senate,
FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/09/12/missouri
-measure-nullifying-federal-gun-laws-fails-in-state-senate/; see also Robert A. Levy, The
Limits of Nullification, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2013, at A23 (commenting on the proposed
Missouri bill in the context of the modern nullification movement more broadly).
342. Wyoming, for instance, which has such a statute, has never arrested a federal officer
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modern sovereignty movement, in both its rhetoric and substantive content, likely
minimizes (but does not eradicate) the problems of disunion traditionally associated
with nullification.343
Apart from its implications for national supremacy, vertical departmentalism may
also be criticized on the more general grounds that it produces interjurisdictional legal
disparities and is detrimental to the rule of law.344 Conflicting interpretations of
constitutional rules can create a type of “interpretive anarchy,”345 thereby muddling the
legal obligations of state actors and private citizens.346 Direct nullification may also
engender lawlessness to the extent it invites civil disobedience.347 Furthermore,
because it enables a broader range of participation in the interpretive enterprise, vertical
departmentalism may amplify extremist viewpoints that would otherwise be muffled.
This effect is exaggerated by the fact that nullification, as a tool of the dissenter, is
disproportionately likely to be utilized by politicians outside the mainstream.
Two observations serve to mitigate these concerns. First, although vertical
departmentalism can reduce uniformity on certain issues, it may also solidify
constitutional supremacy by compelling state officers to grapple directly with the
constitutional text.348 Claims that departmentalism undermines the rule of law fail to
recognize the “profound difference between the rule of law and submission to any
particular institution’s understanding of what the law requires.”349 Opposition
statutes—even when they appear to contradict settled judicial precedent—
universally assert fidelity to the Constitution itself.350 To the extent it forces
governmental actors to engage with the text, departmentalism arguably reinforces
the validity and authority of constitutional norms.351
Second, the legal discrepancies produced by a scheme of interpretive pluralism
will frequently be both temporary and constructive. Just as it serves to forestall the

for violating it. Bazelon, supra note 233.
343. See, e.g., Claiborne, supra note 23, at 952, 956–57.
344. BURGESS, supra note 314, at 20; see also Kight, supra note 12, at 556. Many of the
criticisms explored in this section are also applicable to horizontal departmentalism.
345. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 12, at 1379; see also Levinson, supra note 317, at 1077
(“The critique of Protestantism has always included references to its potential for anarchy.”).
346. Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. REV.
991, 994–95 (1987).
347. Jost, supra note 136, at 871.
348. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 322, at 101 (“Democratic institutions will only take
the Constitution seriously if they have some sense of stake in it.”).
349. Levinson, supra note 317, at 1076; cf. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 12, at 1362
(noting that the rejection of judicial supremacy is consistent with the acceptance of
constitutional supremacy).
350. The force of this argument is partially reduced by the fact that even John Calhoun
claimed to be acting in conformity with the Constitution; this purported faithfulness to the
Constitution obviously did not preclude Calhoun’s efforts from posing a serious threat to the
rule of law. See W. KIRK WOOD, 2 NULLIFICATION, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 1776–1833,
at 115 (2009) (describing Calhoun’s position that the principle of nullification was inherent in
the federal structure established by the Constitution). The disruptive features associated with
Calhoun’s program, though, are mitigated in the modern context by other characteristics of
contemporary state opposition—such as submission to judicial decrees.
351. See BURGESS, supra note 314, at 122.
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implementation of dubious federal interpretations, vertical departmentalism may in
practice temper extreme views and prompt competing governmental actors to strive
for a degree of reflective equilibrium.352 “[T]he natural consequences of shared
interpretive power . . . are often compromise, accommodation, or partial resolution—
not constitutional disaster.”353 In this light, state participation in the interpretive
process is capable of contributing positively to the formation of stable, enduring
constitutional settlements.354 Constitutional constructions or resolutions that emerge
from popular consensus after a period of intensive debate may even achieve a binding
quality absent in judicial decrees imposed by ipse dixit.355
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to sketch a comprehensive portrait of an important
modern political movement: widespread state resistance to national policy. It has
sought not only to establish a conceptual framework for parsing the movement’s
functional and purposive qualities but also to identify a normative foundation for
assessing its political legitimacy. Opposition measures, which are facially designed to
serve a host of different functions, represent effective tools of dissent that have the
potential to alter the course of constitutional adjudication and the content of federal
policy. These statutes are united by their use of constitutional language, their political
variability, and their territoriality. As a result, they constitute a unified and distinctive
political phenomenon worthy of examination on its own terms.
Although any normative assessment of this movement is intrinsically plagued by
certain intractable empirical questions, opposition measures are accompanied by at
least a modicum of political value to the extent they promote the aims of federalism
within the constraints imposed by a national system. Modern exercises of state
interpretive discretion occur primarily in the interstices of federal supremacy,
thereby providing the benefits of departmentalism without posing any serious threat
of national destabilization. The contemporary sovereignty movement thus represents
a valuable element in the ongoing American effort to accommodate meaningful state
autonomy with the demands of federal union.

352. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42–44 (rev. ed. 1999).
353. Paulsen, supra note 12, at 329; see also id. at 324 (“[C]hecked independence does not
invariably lead to meltdown; rather, it typically leads to compromise and moderation.”
(emphasis in original)).
354. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 322, at 105 (“Emotionally charged and highly
divisive issues are best resolved through political compromises that yield middle-ground
solutions, rather than through an absolutist, and often rigid, judicial pronouncement.”); cf.
Hays, supra note 40, at 219 (“Deadlock over constitutional policy will be resolved but only
after one side builds sufficient support either on the merits or through electoral victories.”).
355. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 322, at 90–91; see also Thomas M. Keck, Beyond
Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
151, 152 (2009) (discussing the “backlash thesis,” which posits that “unpopular judicial
decisions provoke political reactions that undercut their effectiveness”).

